

# Introduction

## Re-cognising the Body-Mind in Shakespeare's Theatre

*Laurie Johnson, John Sutton, and Evelyn Tribble*

The phrase “the mind-body problem” does not point to a single, unitary, perennial, and obvious human concern. Many people in different times and places have individually and collectively puzzled or agonized—in a range of intellectual, spiritual, and practical contexts—over the relations between various aspects of their nature which can operate in harmony or in tension. In English and other European languages, terms like *psychological* and *physical* have come to label what are sometimes seen as two realms or two sets of features and processes—the ingredients for that “mind-body problem.” Yet both *body* and *mind* have complex and uncertain semantics that exceed the simple binary encapsulated within the parameters of this conceptual “problem.” There is dramatic historical change and cross-cultural variation in the usage and meaning of *mind*, *psychology*, and *body*, of apparently central related general terms such as *cognition* and *consciousness*, and of many more specific “psychological” terms such as *emotion* and *memory*.<sup>1</sup>

By adopting the less familiar conjoined phrase *body-mind* in this volume, we seek therefore to defamiliarize our topics and to embrace the cultural, historical, and indeed scientific diversity of views, practices, and problems about thinking and the passions, imagining and dreaming, planning and communicating—about touch and vision and pain and fury. The essays we include cover an extraordinary array of “body-mind” topics, which cannot be reduced to singular terms. But even the label *body-mind*, of course, bears traces of the two connected dichotomous assumptions that our contributors seek to combat: the ideas that *mind* and *body* each name a unified set of phenomena held together by unique properties, and that there is thus a single problem about how they relate or connect. As a number of these essays suggest, we are so culturally marked by these historically specific assumptions that it is difficult to bracket them in addressing other ways of feeling, reasoning, remembering, or grieving embedded in quite different lived worlds.

In invoking the phrase *body-mind*, we also query the standard historical attribution of a damaging dualism to the “wound inflicted by

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1 the Cartesian split of mind and body.”<sup>2</sup> Terms such as *pre-Cartesian*  
2 can function as convenient shorthand to note the characteristic melding  
3 of physiology and psychology so often seen in early modern humoral  
4 and medical discourse, as indeed it is used by many of our own con-  
5 tributors. But within the context of a volume of essays about the body-  
6 mind in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, we suggest  
7 that the labels *Cartesian*, *pre-Cartesian*, and *post-Cartesian* can mis-  
8 lead as well as inform our views of the body-mind. First, there were  
9 of course powerful earlier dualist frameworks in play in western cul-  
10 ture: certain forms of Platonist and Christian thought and practice, to  
11 take just two key traditions, imposed or recommended dramatic divides  
12 between body and soul. Second, we risk a teleological reading of the  
13 unique historical discourses and feelings about the body around 1600  
14 if we see these only as “pre-” Cartesian. We oversimplify if we simply  
15 read Descartes back into earlier and more alien nondualist frameworks  
16 for inhabiting the body-mind. Casting holistic humoral materialism  
17 as simple antecedents to a brutal “Cartesian” rupture or identifying  
18 putative early seventeenth-century signs of interiority and individualis-  
19 tic depth as mere harbingers of the Cartesian “invention of the mind”  
20 flattens out the complex landscape of the body-mind as it is diversely  
21 articulated in the early seventeenth century. Moreover, recent scholar-  
22 ship on Descartes’s own work and context overturns the easy narrative  
23 by which the *cogito* alone was meant to ground an entire system of  
24 knowledge. Descartes was a natural philosopher of matter and motion  
25 who attributed an extraordinary range of capacities to biological sys-  
26 tems embedded in complex environments; he also attributed memory,  
27 representation, sentience, and imagination to nonhuman animals, Des-  
28 cartes consistently focused in the human case on the union or integra-  
29 tion of soul and body. Far from exclusively privileging the rational  
30 soul, his work substantially restricted its role and scope. He spent more  
31 time and energy working out our nature as complex bodies—not mere  
32 objects cut off from the world, responding passively to the whim of the  
33 soul—but fully and holistically embedded in the buzzing whirl of the  
34 fluid-filled cosmos.<sup>3</sup>

35 However we read the history of this debate, increasingly new research  
36 in the cognitive sciences and the humanities alike no longer univocally  
37 supports privileging the active rational mind over passive biology. We  
38 first might note that the cognitive sciences themselves are by no means a  
39 monolithic entity, instead denoting a diverse and often divided multidis-  
40 ciplinary field. To be sure, some dominant movements within it continue  
41 to model cognition as serial digital computation, or neurocentrically  
42 reduce thought and affect to brain processes alone. Classical cognitive  
43 science has been rightly criticized for its apparent *disembodiment*, its  
44 assumption that the body and world primarily function as input-output  
45 devices for the brain, walling off perception and action from so-called  
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internal cognitive processes, in what Susan Hurley has critiqued as the “classical sandwich.”<sup>4</sup> However, in recent decades challenges to this model have become increasingly mainstream within the cognitive sciences. Cognition is increasingly seen, within these new frameworks, as “enactive,” “embodied,” “distributed,” “situated,” or “extended.” Emerging paradigms in the cognitive sciences have increasingly sought to embody and extend cognition beyond the brain. The study of *situated* minds is intended to go decisively beyond what goes on in the individual skull, examining instead embodied, enactive, dynamic, and distributed cognitive processes as already bodily, social, practical, and worldly.<sup>5</sup> Thus the “mind” as it is currently conceived in many strands of the cognitive sciences is wildly heterogeneous, an on-the-fly assemblage of neural, kinesthetic, somatic, interpersonal, and material resources. We can, in other words, invoke these trends precisely to defamiliarize the idea of the separateness of bodies *and* minds.

Of course, researchers in the humanities long ago turned their attention to the body. Nearly two decades ago, the “bodily turn” was well enough established and diverse enough to provoke Caroline Bynum’s question: “Why all the Fuss about the Body?”<sup>6</sup> As David Hillman and Carla Mazzio remark in *The Body in Parts*, in that essay Bynum had laid down the challenge for body work in the humanities since the body had by that time already become “no topic, or, perhaps, almost all topics.”<sup>7</sup> The revisionary work carried out by Hillman and Mazzio and the contributors to *The Body in Parts* went far in both theorizing the early modern body and in carrying out an acute and particular examination of its “parts”: entrails, nerves, breasts, bellies, brains, genitalia. Hillman and Mazzio caution against imposing a spurious unity upon the body: “in early modern representations, even or especially as a fantasy of the ‘whole body’ emerges, the body is at the same time always, and perhaps inevitably, a body in parts.”<sup>8</sup> In drawing attention to the “materialist habits of early modern thought,”<sup>9</sup> Hillman in his contribution to *The Body in Parts* makes a strong case for what Gail Kern Paster terms the “early modern habits of bodily thought and sensation.”<sup>10</sup> *The Body in Parts* consolidated earlier work and sparked sustained and productive attention to the body in the early modern period, especially within the context of Galenic thought and humoral theory, in which internal and external states are firmly yoked—indeed, mutually constitutive.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, research on the ways in which body itself is shaped by social and political forces has been a mainstay of New Historicist thought, particularly insofar as it has been influenced by the earlier work of Michel Foucault. Such work provides a rich foundation upon which the present collection of essays builds.

Yet as discussions of body waxed, explicit attention to mind waned, perhaps as a result of concerns that the concept paved the way for a latent universalism to emerge. In “Nervous Tension,” Paster wrote of

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1 her desire to “produce a history of affects and behaviors resistant to the  
2 seductive evasions and erasures of essentialism.”<sup>12</sup> If the body seems in  
3 danger of essentialist readings, perhaps even more so might the mind,  
4 particularly as it is sometimes construed in purely rationalist or “cogni-  
5 tivist” terms.<sup>13</sup> It must be admitted that there is a strongly universalist  
6 or essentialist strain in some so-called cognitive approaches to litera-  
7 ture, especially as articulated in more extreme forms of literary Darwin-  
8 ism.<sup>14</sup> But as the authors of our essays show, attention to the concept of  
9 the “body-mind” can reinvigorate our understanding of the social and  
10 extended nature of cognition in the early modern period—what Paster  
11 describes in her linking piece in this collection as the “ecological  
12 framework of early modern personhood.” In our view, expanding our  
13 ambit to the “body-mind” has the potential to open up questions of  
14 skill, animation, and kinesthesia. As Garrett Sullivan astutely observes  
15 in this volume, embodiment is sometimes viewed as a limiting boundary  
16 rather than as means of extension. Such concerns have been echoed in  
17 the emerging field of neuroanthropology, in which researchers such as  
18 Tim Ingold and Greg Downey have pointed out that the word *embodi-*  
19 *ment* can imply the subjugation of the body within a social field. As  
20 Ingold suggests, we might think “of the body not as a sink into which  
21 practices settle like sediment in a ditch, but rather as a dynamic center  
22 of unfolding activity.”<sup>15</sup>

23 It is important to remember that these lines of inquiry are more than  
24 merely academic—it remains palpably evident that there is much at  
25 stake in the shaping of how Shakespeare and his contemporaries are  
26 viewed within the popular imaginary. A prelapsarian myth persists of  
27 Shakespeare and (as he tends to be too often set apart from) the early  
28 moderns. The discursive fields within which this version of history cir-  
29 culates extends beyond the reach of fiction and hyperbolic populism  
30 masquerading as criticism—Shakespeare’s invention of the human, for  
31 example.<sup>16</sup> No less now than at any other time, the myths that persist  
32 within the broad popular imaginary also have their analogues within  
33 putatively objective medical or scientific writing. In two recent essays  
34 in medical journals, for example, medical practitioner Kenneth Heaton  
35 has argued that Shakespeare was particularly adept at describing the  
36 physical symptoms or sensory disturbances associated with emotional  
37 or mental upset.<sup>17</sup> By analyzing all of Shakespeare’s plays and poems  
38 alongside forty-six genre-matched works by his contemporaries, Heaton  
39 showed that such conditions as breathlessness, fatigue, and vertigo were  
40 described far more often in Shakespeare’s work in correlation with a  
41 heightened emotional state such as grief than in works by other writers  
42 of the same era, leading him to conclude, “Shakespeare’s perception that  
43 numbness and enhanced sensation can have a psychological origin seems  
44 not to have been shared by his contemporaries.”<sup>18</sup> Heaton’s findings  
45  
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are *symptomatic*, we suggest, in two ways: first, they are symptomatic of the trend in popular appropriations of Shakespeare—they bear the hallmarks of modern readings that seek to dislocate the works of Shakespeare from their early modern moorings, to make Shakespeare a thoroughly modern thinker; second, Heaton’s comments are “symptomatic” because they read surface phenomena as having “a psychological origin.” According to this symptomatic reasoning, Heaton is prepared to read connections between sensations and emotions in *Shakespeare* as evidence of an awareness in the playwright that the origins of external distress reside in inner tumult, while at the same time he makes the mistake that Paster has consistently criticized scholars for making—of assuming that the psychological realm, for early moderns, is distinct from the physiological realm, and that thus physiological accounts of what we see as psychological phenomena must simply be metaphorical.<sup>19</sup> Yet, *non causa pro causa*—Shakespeare and his contemporaries did not view correlation as causation or metaphor in quite the same way as Heaton and his symptomatic reading.

Heaton dismisses in rather contemptuous fashion the medical knowledge of the early moderns:

It is unsafe to try and contextualise the present findings by commenting on the occurrence of specific diseases in Shakespeare’s time because concepts of physiology and disease were crude and fanciful, still dominated by Galenical ideas like the four humours. The circulation of the blood was not established until after Shakespeare died.<sup>20</sup>

All the more reason, we suggest, to not try to read Shakespeare and his coevals outside of their milieu—to resist the desire to want to recuperate Shakespeare as a timeless genius able to rise above the “crude and fanciful” notions that pervaded the thinking of all around him. No matter how crude or fanciful such notions may seem, the fact remains that the early moderns—Shakespeare included—left for us myriad disparate artefacts of the embodied cognition through which they conceived their world. One such artefact is the language itself—as the essays in *The Body in Parts* demonstrated, the language of the body was at one and the same time also the language through which abstractions were expressed, so a phrase like time being “out of joint” drew its particular force through reference to the painful physical dislocation of the joints.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, as Laurie Johnson has shown, the word *anxiety* comes into English at precisely this moment in history, circa 1611, because this is the moment when a need for such a word enters the language—what *anxiety* names is the very prospect confronting the early moderns that body and mind may be separable aspects of selfhood.<sup>22</sup> While Shakespeare never used the term, Johnson argues that he describes anxiety remarkably well,

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1 thereby contributing to the cultural moment out of which the word *anxi-*  
2 *ety* comes into being in its English form.

3 As we and our contributors articulate the “body-mind,” then, it is open  
4 and contingent, a fluid assemblage that includes both a wealth of body-  
5 related parts and processes and a great diversity of psychological phenom-  
6 ena well beyond “subjectivity” and “mind,” “self” and “inwardness.”  
7 Our own interdisciplinary cognitive sciences expand to address material  
8 agency and embodied interaction, communication and collaboration, soci-  
9 ality and cognitive artefacts.<sup>23</sup> Likewise, the heterogeneous early modern  
10 body-mind phenomena discussed in the essays—which follow range from  
11 wounds, torture, blood, scars, poison and blushing to guilt, sound, gesture,  
12 rhythm, sympathy, rage, madness, and anguish. Rather than seeking to  
13 divorce Shakespeare from his early modern milieu, the contributors to this  
14 collection consider the early modern theatre as offering fertile ground for  
15 reassessing the body-mind, whether through a distributed model of cogni-  
16 tion for understanding early modern theatrical practices—as in the work  
17 of Evelyn Tribble<sup>24</sup> and in Johnson’s account in this volume of the way in  
18 which this work guards against inherent limitations within the subversion-  
19 containment debates in Shakespeare Studies—or a reconsideration of the  
20 demonic infiltration of thought in the early modern period, as outlined here  
21 by Mary Floyd-Wilson; or the haptic nature of affect from the early modern  
22 period to the present, as Ros King, Jennifer Rae McDermott, and others  
23 explain in the present collection. In keeping with this sense that physical  
24 and psychological phenomena are complexly intercalated within the  
25 early modern body-mind, the editors have opted to avoid using any obvious  
26 internal divisions, enabling all of the chapters to speak to each of those that  
27 precede and follow them. Into this mix we have a number of shorter linking  
28 pieces that respond in a variety of ways to issues and arguments raised in  
29 the chapters surrounding them.

30 In the first chapter, David Hawkes examines early modern approaches to  
31 torture and physical pain as the litmus test for Francis Bacon’s descriptions  
32 of the adversarial relation in which the empirical scientist tortures nature  
33 into giving up her secrets. Shakespeare’s frequent deployments of the same  
34 image serve to defend the nonmaterial subject or “soul” from encroaching  
35 materialist thought. Shifting our attention into the playhouse, Ros King  
36 is nevertheless concerned in the second chapter with the extent to which  
37 mindfulness and the expression of feeling among performers and audience  
38 can be tested in the dynamic play of the playhouse. There is thus in the first  
39 two chapters a question mark placed at the limits of empiricism, and King  
40 reminds us that the experience of the play is a legitimate study of these  
41 limits, as Shakespeare’s depiction of audience participation in *Much Ado*  
42 *About Nothing* bears witness.

43 While playing creates the interpersonal space in which meaning—and,  
44 by association, the expression of feelings—can be negotiated rather than  
45 simply communicated, Emma Firestone’s analysis of the language of *hot*  
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and <i>cold</i> in relation to Prince Hal suggests that the interplay of word and	1
body-mind is possibly cognitively weighted in favor of the word. When	2
Hal is cold and Hotspur is, well, hot, at least in the language through	3
which we understand their qualities, our interpersonal inclinations follow	4
a deep-seated bias in which warmth equals trustworthiness. The reader	5
who peruses this book sequentially will encounter the first of our linking	6
segments at this point, wherein Garrett Sullivan takes up the challenge of	7
the first three chapters by looking to the work of Thomas Kyd and John	8
Webster as examples of how, <i>pace</i> Shakespeare, there is a widespread concern	9
within Renaissance drama with the performance of subjectivity. The	10
subject that treads the boards of the early modern stage is no monad—it is	11
actively worked upon by and works upon forces that shape the world. One	12
such force—as Mary Floyd-Wilson explains in her reading of Thomas Hey-	13
wood’s <i>A Woman Killed with Kindness</i> —is diabolical indeed. It should be	14
absurd to think of discussing early modern cognition without reference to	15
the soul and the myriad temptations to which it is heir, yet Floyd-Wilson	16
notes that readings of Heywood’s play have tended to read Anne’s adultery	17
as a consequence of her inability to think for herself due to dominant gender	18
roles in the marital arrangement. Floyd-Wilson argues compellingly	19
instead that Anne gives in to temptation as a demonstration of “the period’s	20
most pressing question about cognition: Can you call your thoughts your	21
own, or were they planted by the Devil?”	22
Michael Schoenfeldt’s linking segment, which follows James A.	23
Knapp’s treatment of scenes of misrecognition in <i>Much Ado About</i>	24
<i>Nothing</i> , pursues the pressing question posed by diabolical temptation	25
as a subset of the more general doubt pervading the early modern period	26
about the permeability of the body-mind. Knapp’s discussion of misrec-	27
ognition and the staging of theatrical illusion in <i>Much Ado</i> might be	28
compared here with King’s study of play within the same play. Again,	29
the limits of perception are in question. Similar comparisons might be	30
made between the chapters by Darryl Chalk and Hardin Aasand, whose	31
respective readings of <i>The Winter’s Tale</i> we position here side by side.	32
Whereas heat might have rendered Hotspur more trustworthy by com-	33
parison with the cold Prince Hal in Firestone’s reading of the <i>Henriad</i> ,	34
the potential is offered in <i>Winter’s Tale</i> for a concatenation of forces to	35
come together to make Leontes “too hot,” which Chalk explains as a	36
result of “contagion by image.” The same is also presented by Chalk as	37
an explanation for the seemingly inexplicable death of Mamillius. By	38
contrast to Chalk’s reading of the sudden ruptures plaguing the play’s	39
opening scenes, as Schoenfeldt explains, Aasand offers a reading in	40
which the figure of Time, like the Devil, can function as a singularity	41
upon which perception can be fixed as a constant external reference	42
point for the unreliable human senses.	43
Paster’s linking segment weaves together numerous threads of our col-	44
lection through her reading of the ecology of the passions as it is played	45
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1 out in the trope of the spider in the cup in *The Winter's Tale*. This play  
2 has become a sort of touchstone in our collection, a singularity fixing  
3 our critical gaze. Perhaps it is in Shakespeare's late plays, and the genre  
4 of romance, that the imbrication of the "body-mind" becomes most visible.  
5 Jennifer Rae McDermott focuses our attention further on the spider's  
6 touch in *Othello*, but she does so in order to point out that the  
7 metaphor of spider's touch-in-web functions both on an individual level,  
8 in the desire to hold woven properties, and on a communal level, where  
9 threads forge networks of feeling among the audience. Tiffany Hoffman's  
10 reading of the blush in *Coriolanus* likewise emphasizes the social dimension  
11 of perception, wherein the surface appearance is meaningless without  
12 the observer to participate in apprehending its meaning. A tension  
13 may therefore be seen to be emerging here: whereas earlier chapters deal  
14 with the potential for the interpersonal relation to be shaped by relatively  
15 fixed universes of meaning around specific words and phenomena, these  
16 later chapters identify the confluence of the interpersonal as the site of  
17 dynamic cognitive processes.

18 Katherine Rowe provides the link toward a model of distributed cognition  
19 that emerges logically in this last grouping of chapters. As Rowe also  
20 mentions and as Johnson argues in his chapter, the distributed cognition  
21 model finds a natural home within cultural histories of early modern  
22 cognition, given the importance placed in both on the constitutive role  
23 of the material artefact in dynamic *cultural* processes. Lianne Habinek's  
24 chapter does not focus on distributed cognition per se but it does, importantly,  
25 situate early modern thought about the brain and brain injury  
26 within a cultural history of early modern medical discourses, which,  
27 in turn, is depicted in Hamlet's concern with the impermanence of the  
28 "book and volume" of his own brain. Heaton may dismiss early modern  
29 medical beliefs as crude and fanciful, yet Habinek maps the broad cultural  
30 field in which these early modern beliefs pave the way for modern  
31 lesion studies. Jan Purnis maps a similar cultural field around the early  
32 modern belief in the localization of the "second brain" in the human gut  
33 and digestive system, which modern studies into the enteric nervous system  
34 are showing to also be far from crude or fanciful. For both Habinek  
35 and Purnis, then, a particular body part is seen as participating in the  
36 early modern understanding of mind and mental phenomena, yet these  
37 bodily parts are also fundamentally porous, as we have seen, and are  
38 capable of being imprinted and reprinted anew on the basis of external  
39 phenomena. In such an arrangement, cognition does not happen in  
40 response to the outside world; rather, there is constant interplay between  
41 bodies wherein genuinely embodied cognition occurs. Every chapter in  
42 this volume speaks in some way, and from very different backgrounds  
43 and approaches, to this arrangement that we seek to understand on this  
44 side of history through the invocation of the "body-mind"—which we  
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use here devoid of any qualifying phrase: *sans* “relationship,” *sans* “dualism,” and certainly *sans* “problem.”

## NOTES

1. For discussions of these issues, see Anna Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Graham Richards, *Mental Machinery: The Origins and Consequences of Psychological Ideas Part 1: 1600 to 1850* (London: Athlone Press, 1992); Timothy J. Reiss, “Denying Body, Making Self?: Histories and Identities,” in *Against Autonomy: Global Dialectics of Cultural Exchange*, ed. Timothy J. Reiss (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002): 184–218; Paul S. Macdonald, *History of the Concept of Mind: Speculations about Soul, Mind, and Spirit from Homer to Hume* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); Mengistu Amberber, ed., *The Language of Memory in a Cross-Linguistic Perspective* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2007); W. I. Matson, “Why Isn’t the Mind-Body Problem Ancient?,” in *Mind, Matter, and Method*, ed. Paul K. Feyerabend and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966): 92–102; and Peter King, “Why Isn’t the Mind-Body Problem Medieval?,” in *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind-Body Problem from Avicenna to the Enlightenment*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Berlin: Springer, 2007): 187–205.
2. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, “Animation: The Fundamental, Essential, and Properly Descriptive Concept,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 42.3 (2009): 375–400; esp. 375.
3. See Stephen Gaukroger, *Descartes: An Intellectual Biography* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); John Sutton, *Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Catherine Wilson, “Descartes and the Corporeal Mind: Some Implications of the Regius Affair,” *Descartes’ Natural Philosophy*, ed. Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, and John Sutton (London: Routledge, 2000): 659–679; and Reiss. As Gaukroger notes, for at least a century after Descartes’s death, his philosophy was attacked less for its incoherent dualism than for the specter of atheistic materialism that both conservatives and enthusiasts read into it: with his scientific or natural-philosophical works read more than the *Meditations*, it was arguably only after Kantian historians of philosophy identified Descartes as the arch-rationalist that he came to play the familiar textbook role of the evil demon at the origin of the modern world.
4. Susan Hurley, “Perception and Action: Alternative Views,” *Synthese* 129.1 (2001): 3–40.
5. The most important single source for these movements is Andy Clark, *Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and Mind Together Again* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1997). For broader takes on their history and current status, see Margaret Boden, *Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Philip Robbins and Murat Ayede, *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
6. Caroline Bynum, “Why all the Fuss about the Body: A Medievalist’s Perspective,” *Critical Inquiry* 22 (Autumn 1995): 1–33.

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- 1 7. Bynum, 2; see David Hillman and Carla Mazzio, *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe* (New York and London: Routledge, 1997), xii.
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- 4 8. Hillman and Mazzio, xviii.
- 5 9. David Hillman, "Visceral Knowledge," in Hillman and Mazzio, 81–106, esp. 82.
- 6 10. Gail Kern Paster, "Nervous Tension," in Hillman and Mazzio, 107–127, esp. 107.
- 7
- 8 11. See, among others, Michael Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Gail Kern Paster, *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); and for an overview, see Sean McDowell, "The View from the Interior: The New Body Scholarship in Renaissance/Early Modern Studies," *Literature Compass* 3:4 (July 2006): 779–791; Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett Sullivan, eds., *Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); and Laurie Johnson, "Differing Returns: On History, Bodies and Early Modern Lives," *Early Modern Literary Studies* Special Issue 19 (2009): 14.1–9.
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- 18 12. Paster, "Nervous Tension," 123.
- 19 13. Slavoj Žižek, for instance, equates "cognitivism" with rational managerialism; see "Cultural Studies versus the 'Third Culture,'" *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 101.1 (2002): 19–32.
- 20
- 21 14. For a critique of such models, see Jonathan Kramnick, "Against Literary Darwinism," *Critical Inquiry* 37 (2011): 315–347. For alternatives to this universalist strain, see, for example, John Sutton and Evelyn Tribble, "Minds In and Out of Time: Memory, Embodied Skill, Anachronism, and Performance," *Textual Practice* 26.4 (2012): 587–607; and Mark J. Bruhn, "Introduction: Exchange Values: Poetics and Cognitive Science," *Poetics Today* 32.3 (2012): 403–460.
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- 27 15. See Greg Downey, "Balancing between Cultures: Equilibrium in Caporeia," in *The Encultured Brain: An Introduction to Neuroanthropology*, ed. Daniel Lende and Greg Downey (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2012): 169–194, esp. 187; Tim Ingold, "Towards an Ecology of Materials," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 41 (2012): 427–442; esp. 437.
- 28
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- 32 16. Harold Bloom, *Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human* (New York: Fourth Estate, 1998).
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- 34 17. Kenneth Heaton, "Body-Conscious Shakespeare: Sensory Disturbances in Troubled Characters," *Medical Humanities* 37.2 (2011): 97–102; "Somatic Expressions of Grief and Psychosomatic Illness in the Work of William Shakespeare and His Coevals," *Journal of Psychosomatic Research* 73.4 (2012): 301–306.
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- 38 18. Heaton, "Body-Conscious," 101.
- 39 19. Gail Kern Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993).
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- 41 20. Heaton, "Somatic," 304.
- 42 21. Marjorie Garber, "Out of Joint," in Hillman and Mazzio, 23–52.
- 43 22. Laurence Johnson, "'Nobler in the Mind': The Emergence of Early Modern Anxiety," *AUMLA Special Issue* (December 2009): 141–156.
- 44 23. Edwin Hutchins, "Material Anchors for Conceptual Blends," *Journal of Pragmatics* 37 (2005): 1555–1577; Lambros Malafouris and Colin Renfrew,
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eds., <i>The Cognitive Life of Things</i> (Cambridge: McDonald Institute, 2010);	1
Jürgen Streeck, Charles Goodwin, and Curtis LeBaron, eds., <i>Embodied</i>	2
<i>Interaction: Language and Body in the Material World</i> (Cambridge: Cam-	3
bridge University Press, 2011).	4
24. Evelyn B. Tribble, <i>Cognition in the Globe: Attention and Memory in Shake-</i>	5
<i>speare's Theatre</i> (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).	6
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