

HERMES

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WHERE WAS THOUGHT?

NOTES TOWARDS A GENEALOGY OF MIND

Introduction: the survival of the soul

'One day the soul did not exist,
neither did the mind,
as for consciousness, no-one had ever thought
of it,
but where, for that matter, was thought, in a
world made up
solely of warring elements no sooner destroyed
than recomposed,
for thought is a luxury of peacetime.'

Antonin Artaud¹

The white male subject, his rational self freely wielding his autonomous will, has long dominated his own society, and penetrated, possessed and transformed the societies of others. Mind/body dualism, that intricate and private edifice constructed and inhabited by male philosophers, has been both legitimising foundation and symptomatically enduring sign of such domination. This paper is about philosophy's spillages, its presence and effects in the overlapping margins of psychology, society, literature and history.

Most philosophers today, if not most people, are uncompromising materialists. Christian and Cartesian doctrines of non-physical substance, whether divine, ghostly, or purely mental, are rejected; there are, after all, no more *kinds* of thing in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy. The old epic quests are off; there can be no transcendent knowledge of a non-empirical world of forms, or of eternal and immutable moral realities, no incorrigible purely rational

introspection of a uniquely conscious mind. The 'great treadmills of Western philosophy, the attempts to analyse the concepts of Truth, Reason and the rest',² no longer exhaust the range of philosophical debate, if indeed they ever did.

But certain theoretical assumptions, and corresponding 'common sense' intuitions, may yet retain the marks of old divisions. The soul did perhaps die soon after God; but it may, ironically, have survived its own death, as material effects of its isolation and theoretical insulation endure.

So, certain bare juxtapositions... some assumptions about thought, will, self and mental functions. Rational thought was 'placed' by the Cartesians during the middle and late 17th century in an autonomous, non-extended and non-physical 'locus' of

control; the body, on the other hand, was to be explained in solely mechanical terms. The brain and the nerves might one day be mechanistically understood, but this under-

standing would give us no knowledge of rational thought and free action. I'm not going to go into any more detail than that about substance dualism. Here I'm interested, rather, in its historical implications for, and effects on, both theoretical and 'common sense' ideas about subjectivity and psychology.

We no longer accept the idea of a non-material mind: but puzzles remain:

1 Where and what was 'thought' before Cartesianism? Can we

‘There are, after all,
no more *kinds* of thing
in heaven and earth
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our philosophy...’

- glimpse alternative assumptions about the mind?
- 2 How did it get where it was going, into the non-physical, rational mind?
 - 3 What effects did its 'location' in the non-physical soul have on other beliefs and disciplines while it was there?
 - 4 How did it get out, if it indeed has?
 - 5 Where and what is it now?

These are all complex and under-noticed questions. Rashly, I want in this paper to point towards some of the possible approaches to not one but the first three of them, with a few thoughts on the implications of my approaches for answers to the fifth. So, a mosaic, lacking depth. Pull other strands, and other, more coherent, patterns, webs, will form. Genealogy, of course, 'demands relentless erudition'³ and I am well aware of the sketchy and underdetermined nature of this one trajectory.

First, then, two routes back beyond the late 17th century, the first from outside, the second from inside, philosophy.

1.1 Jacobean drama

Brecht, pleading:

'We ask you expressly to discover
That what happens all the time is not natural.'
Bertholt Brecht⁴

So we dig for traces of lost struggles, re-drawing maps of other worlds, in the face of long reductive habits of reading our own image into difference. Recent 17th century studies suggest that 'man' is an invention of a less recent date than Foucault's 19th century focus allowed. But, to add to the classical Marxist account of the emergence of a new economic subject with the emergence of capitalism, we seek a more multiform story.

A story of an overdetermined birth, the birth of the autonomous male subject of liberal humanism, blessed with a new interiority, forgetful of intrusive corporeality, and defined by differences to which he is nevertheless oblivious.

A privileged site for viewing this difficult birth, before the fledgling mind is assimilated into and insulated by philosophy? Here, the desire-ridden, unsanitised works of the Jacobean, writing in the first quarter of the 17th century, at the time of Descartes' youth, of the work of Galileo and Bacon. Long invisible beneath the mythical 'Shakespeare' of moral criticism, long despised for their macabre

sensationalism, their foregrounding of the spectacular body, their inability to find, even to seek, harmonious resolution: Marston, Webster, Middleton, Ford, Greville, Tourneur. Just as we re-read Shakespeare (Isabella's silence in response to the Duke's final paternalistic proposal of marriage is no longer gratefully passive acquiescence), we question the accepted minority of the other Jacobean, and relish what Artaud, comparing them to Van Gogh, called their 'abrupt

and barbarous tonal qualities',⁵ which inspired so variously Brecht, Ionesco, Brenton, Barker, as well as Artaud himself. Metaphysical comforts, on learning that our confusions are nothing new. Peter Brook on the Czech theorist Jan Kott:

'Kott is an Elizabethan. Like Shakespeare, like Shakespeare's contemporaries, the world of the flesh and the world of the spirit are indivisible. They coexist painfully in the same frame: the poet has a foot in the mud, an eye on the stars and a dagger in his hand.'⁶

Here, then, a space for theory. We know that the Cartesian reiteration of the church's division of flesh from spirit was seized upon in England as elsewhere, and driven home after the Restoration settlement – and that it set the agenda for our theories of mind. What is visible in the drama of the previous generations as signs of the worlds we have lost?

Firstly, modes of representation which

‘...the world of the flesh and the world of the spirit are indivisible... “the poet has a foot in the mud, an eye on the stars and a dagger in his hand.”’

then disappeared until our century. Layers of commentary in the dumb shows of *The White Devil* or *Antonio's Revenge*, or though Pandarus and Thersites in *Troilus and Cressida*. The tireless reference to their own signifying by such plays as these:

The Revenger's Tragedy, with Vindice congratulating the gods/stagehands on finally matching (divine?) thunder to on-stage crimes;

Beaumont's *The Knight of the Burning Pestle*, in which grocer's boy Ralph, at the instigation of the vociferous grocer's wife, interrupts the prologue to climb onto the stage and wander through the rest of the play's romantic intrigues with his friends Tim and George;

The boy actor playing Cleopatra, imagining the possibility of ignominious display as a captive in Rome, saying:

'I shall see
Some squeaking Cleopatra boy my greatness
I' the posture of a whore'.⁷

Narratives which consume themselves; a joy in paradox (Montaigne, Burton, Browne, Hobbes) which vanishes after the mid-17th century. Sterne and Diderot are striking partly because they are

‘But this foregrounding of a ‘real’ figure behind conflicting psychological surfaces fails, for the subject/object of the quest is not there...’

unique in the 18th century; there is little serious lightness again before Lewis Carroll, Laforgue and Nietzsche.

Pirandellian anti-naturalism is, however, anti-naturalism before the event. Only the illusionistic replacement of the emblematic Jacobean empty space with proscenium stages, perspectives and painted sets, originating in Inigo Jones' court masques and already fully in place in early Restoration drama, gave us to believe that dramatic ‘realism’ was possible *only* by

mirroring nature.⁸ Twentieth century drama, then, challenging illusionistic realism, had to reinvent the audience before it could offend it.

Secondly, the drama reveals a tension between traditions of interiority and corporeality. The spectacular body is continually present, as visible on stage as on the scaffold. Thus the preoccupations with violence, sexuality and death which Eliot and humanist criticism generally found so repugnant. A random sample:

Sejanus, torn to atoms by the rude

‘What is visible in the drama of the previous generations as signs of the worlds we have lost?’

multitude before his daughter is:

‘deflowered and spoiled
By the rude lust of the licentious hangman’⁹

Annabella in *'Tis Pity She's a Whore*, heart aloft on her brother/lover's dagger, which ‘plough'd up/ Her fruitful womb’;¹⁰

The Duke in *The Revenger's Tragedy*, poisoned by the skull of the woman he murdered nine years previously, while forced to watch his wife's incestuous twines with his bastard son Spurio;

Julio and Piero in *Antonio's Revenge*; Isabella, Camillo and Brachiano in *The White Devil*, all dying by oddly intricate means.

Deaths of the pre-disciplinary body, which, in Francis Barker's words, is ‘systemic not personal... formed across the whole surface of the social as the locus of desire’.¹¹ Out of dramatic context the multiple significations of the corporeal entanglement of sin, cruelty, disease and desire are best exemplified in fiction. In *Lechery's Tragedy: Of the life and death of Veneria the lustful* from *The History of Morindos*, the deceived King of Bohemia places the murdered body of the queen's scullion lover in a coffin:

‘...then to the same dead body, beginning now to putrefy and stink, he tied the live body of

his queen, and so in the coffin closed them up together, that as she enjoyed his fellowship in life so she might consume with him being dead, by which means the very same worms that bred upon the dead carcass in a manner devoured up her live body. And thus were the sins of lust and adultery scourged with a plague but seldom heard of.¹²

But alongside the ubiquity of the visible body in early 17th century drama were harbingers of the new interiority, derived from amalgams of Christian, neo-Stoic and Neoplatonic traditions of hierarchy and essentialism. Catherine Belsey and Jonathan Dollimore have noticed signs of views of the mind as an unlimitable kingdom with an inviolable essence coexisting with the earlier presence of characters as conjunctions of dispositions which do not necessarily cohere.¹³ Flamineo, self-determined in extremity: 'at myself will I begin and end'.¹⁴ In individual characters like Faustus and Hamlet we find intimations of unified subjectivity, of free-standing individuality, particularly in soliloquy as they search for 'that within', intimations of the construction of an essentially private place which later philosophical notions of selfhood were to fill. Humanist criticism has tended to resolve the tensions in these contexts in favour of the later solution. So Hamlet, at least before his return from England, has been a sensitive prince, his central self recognising in himself, even if dimly, both the inactive rogue and the peasant slave. But this foregrounding of a 'real' figure behind conflicting psychological surfaces fails, for the subject/object of the quest is not there, is a chimerical effect of language, not its origin.¹⁵

And yet it was essentialist humanism which prevailed, replacing contemplation of the world and the flesh with the tragedy of the soul and the niceties of the moral sense. In section 2 I return to tracing some of the contours of this epistemological rupture. But first, to suggest the specificity and contingency of essentialism's triumph, I need to mention at least the route of a more direct genealogy of mind.

Where was thought, in the philosophy and psychology of the pre-Cartesian epoch?

1.2 Denaturalising the soul

The division of flesh from spirit, biology from rationality, was alien to a variety of ancient, medieval and Renaissance traditions. Our mind/body problem, as has often been noted, just never seems to have arisen in ancient thought. Indeed, in medical traditions and in certain interpretations of both Aristotle and the Stoics, the mind was essentially embodied, and what we would call naturalistic materialism was at least an option. This even though sophisticated naturalistic theories, like those of Pietro Pomponazzi at the time of the Reformation, and of Thomas Hobbes (for whom thinking is 'nothing but motion in some internal substance of the head'),¹⁶ in the mid-17th century, were too obviously incompatible with theological assumptions about the immortality of the soul and the freedom of the will.¹⁷ It may have been partly in response to Pomponazzi's ideas that the fifth Lateran Council appealed in 1513 to philosophers to find arguments to defend the orthodox

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view of personal immortality, an appeal explicitly (although belatedly) answered by Descartes' *Meditations*.¹⁸

Yet it was not Descartes himself who radically altered the parameters of possibility for future theory, though his work in biology and physiology exerted great influence on subsequent sciences of life and mind. Stephen Gaukroger has shown the intricacy of Descartes' position, in which a radical naturalism with regard to biological function is accompanied, not by a simple polarity of body and mind, but by a triadic relation between matter, an immaterial mind (the only function of which, it sometimes seems, is to communicate with God) and an almost wholly unknowable deity.¹⁹ This sits more easily with occasionalism – the view, held by Calvin and (explicitly) by the Cartesian Malebranche, that God miraculously and continuously intervenes to ensure the parallel running of matter and spirit – than it does to what has traditionally

been called Cartesian interactionist dualism, in which a non-physical mind enters into specific causal relations with physical matter. The Descartes of undergraduate textbook and anti-humanist polemic, then, is a Descartes misinterpreted by both rationalist and empiricist traditions.

But however naturalistic he may have been with regard to a certain range of biological functions, what Descartes *did* do was to sever the connection between the sciences of life and the soul. Aristotle's *De Anima (On the Soul)* is part of the *biological*

offered to the human intellect; and, at the same time, the complete refusal to accept this world as the only one in which man could live, move, and have his being'.²¹

Mechanism was emphatically not intended as a site of resistance to moderate religious supernaturalism. The very exception of mind from nature, from the realm of physical causality, was to safeguard the soul, to preserve the autonomous will.²²

Yet these conservative aims were far from wholly successful. Descartes' works

were condemned by the Sacred Congregation of the Index in Rome in 1663. Supernaturalism did not accept the mechanical philosophy as an ally too easily. Understandably so, for ultimately the new sciences, taken further than their 17th century progenitors had

foreseen, would suggest to others the inadvertent overthrow of the religious and social orders they had been set up to defend. Specifically, mind and will would come to occupy an increasingly anomalous place, in being, for the interactionist dualist, causally connected to a natural world of which they were not part. They had to be further isolated and more securely insulated. They needed to be given over to a transparent, self-conscious subject.

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works, and the Aristotelian tradition's important distinction was not between conscious and unconscious, but between natural and artificial. The study of life in general was often conceived of as the study of three souls: the vegetative, common to all living things; the sensitive, common to all animal life; and the rational, unique to humans. Only the rational soul was ever thought of as perhaps independent of the body. Descartes' revolution was to abolish the sensitive-cum-vegetative souls, and relegate their vital functions to the mechanisms of the body. Suddenly a physiology requires no reference to the soul, and, correspondingly, inquiry into the nature of the soul becomes an introspective, subjective quest. Matter can no longer think.²⁰

Lucien Goldmann, in his influential study of 17th century French thought, *The Hidden God*, points us towards an understanding of the ambiguous consequences of the new mechanical philosophy propounded by Descartes and his circle. The 'tragic mind' of the period, says Goldmann, is to be understood by reference to two factors:

'...the complete and exact understanding of the new world created by rationalistic individualism, together with all the invaluable and scientifically valid acquisitions which this

2 Into the interior

But philosophy, of course, could never effect (or undergo) such a revolution in isolation. How was thought uniquely brought into the non-physical mind, in wider social and intellectual contexts?

There are many stories here for future telling.

Hobbes produces a work called 'Body', a psychology of humans as desiring machines, which focuses on the body's continual motion, its incessant progress of desires.²³ But his resistance to dualism fails, his scathing attack on all doctrines of 'separated essence,' eventuating in his condemnation as a pernicious atheist, and the burning of his books.²⁴ He is excluded from the Royal Society, formed in the aftermath of the Restoration political

settlement to safeguard a mechanistic scientific method which applies a contact-action model to inert matter and extended body, but excludes the mind from natural science.²⁵

Meanwhile a new distinction between public and private, in which sexuality and the corporeal are relegated to secret places, is visible in the aims and content of Pepys' diaries, as he peruses a 'mighty lewd book' in private on the Lord's Day 'to inform himself of the villainy of the world'.²⁶ A new mechanism is established for registering individual authorial credentials; censorship becomes an established part of the mechanisms of power rather than the whim of the particular monarch. Restoration drama has lost its popular audience, no longer engages in controversy in politics and religion, and finds its humour in the comedy of bourgeois manners rather than the horrid laughter which sated the Jacobites. Hobbes' determinism, which sees autonomy of will as an illusion, and action as a result of a complex nexus of physiological and political causes, is rejected in favour of vague Anglican versions of the traditional Catholic liberty of indifference, an incoherent independence of the transcendent subject from all antecedent causal conditions.

But these are mere fragments, here entirely unsubstantiated by 17th century evidence. To what psychological changes would such stories, if accepted, form a background? Raymond Williams has noted that the word 'individual' did not change its meaning from the non-essentialist sense of 'eccentric' and merge into our usage of 'substantial entity' with its connotations of autonomy, rights, responsibilities and obligations, until as late, perhaps, as John Locke's 1690 *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.²⁷ Etymological considerations aren't quite arguments, but they can be suggestive.

There is an intriguing connection here to a body of work, anti-humanist in implication rather than in avowed intent, which arises from one slightly deviant tradition in modern philosophies of

psychology and cognitive science. If male-dominated western philosophy has based its exclusive claims to Truth and Reason on its ostensibly superior conception of the mind, then the possibility of developing any alternative has as a precondition the deconstruction of traditional philosophy of mind and the beginning of a new account which remembers the neurophysiological micro-construction of mind as brain and body situated in physical and social environments.

Kathy Wilkes, in an important series of

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papers, has attacked the twin pillars of 'mind' and 'consciousness' which characterise such traditional philosophies of mind, denying that either names one thing genuinely to be explained by psychology.²⁸ Her primary arguments concern the disunity of existing empirical accounts of the chaotic set of phenomena intuitively grouped under the terms. Neither mind nor consciousness are things, and as terms they fail to group together sets of phenomena which have the coherence and integration required for useful theoretical terms. But Wilkes supplements these points with suggestions about comparable but interestingly dissimilar terms in other languages and, saliently in the present context, about the history of the terms. Etymological detail, which she neatly summarises, shows us the specific emergence of usages of 'consciousness' and 'self-consciousness' to mean 'inwardly sensible or aware' in the mid and late 17th century. Similar developments are traceable in other western European languages.²⁹

If this is right, and the self-conscious subject as locus of control and autonomous origin of action was inserted into theory over a relatively short period of time, Wilkes'

conclusions about the usefulness of the concept for modern psychology will come as no surprise to those who reject the possibility of such a subject. The referents of 'consciousness', then, may be more like a ragbag of diverse mental/physiological phenomena than a fixed and unified entity. Patricia Churchland in similar vein writes:

'...states we now group together as conscious states may no more constitute a natural kind than does, say, dirt, or gems, or things-that-go-bump-in-the-night.'³⁰

But, towards the end of the 17th century, consciousness and personal identity suddenly have become interdependent, mutually defining. The classical modern account of the self is Locke's:

'personal Identity consists... in the Identity of *consciousness* wherein, if Socrates and the present Mayor of Quinborough agree, they are the same Person.'³¹

Unity and continuity of consciousness have become the criteria of subjecthood, and memory is to allow us to recognise our consciousness as the same as it was. Locke

“...in our insistent search to discover more about ourselves we become more baffled than before. We are like archaeologists who dig to discover an ancient city and find traces and fragments of seven separate, inconsistent cultures.”

and empiricists generally were not explicitly dualist, but their official agnosticism about the relation between mind and body ('I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind') shared the epistemological slant of continental rationalism unconcerned with direct questions about the ontology of the mind.³²

The new interdependence of memory, identity, and consciousness had, in the religious and theoretical context of dualism, effects in two directions. Firstly, illusions of transparent subjectivity and unified consciousness left inquiry into the mind a subject only for theology, ethics, and introspective wonder. Secondly, as a result

of that second strand of Cartesianism — the denial of the link between merely mechanical bodily functions and mental functions — the life sciences had only an impoverished and scientific model of brain and physical nature with which to work. Science is denied relevance to the highest concerns of men. In the final two sections I trace the subsequent paths and present fortunes of these divisions: first subjectivity and consciousness; then mechanical explanation and scientific psychology.

3.1 Effects I: mind, self, and consciousness

The warm antiquity of self... binds us profoundly.
Wallace Stevens³³

Criticism of the metaphysics of presence at the centre of western philosophy has rightly noticed our tendency to infer a depth behind our signs, to construct an unchanging reality underneath the surface flux. We succumb to our nostalgia for the absolute, and imprison the body by reifying and rigidifying the soul/mind/individual consciousness. But the

process is never complete; the unity promised and sought always eludes, for there is nothing determinate, no context-independent real presence there to fix. The Scottish novelist James Kennaway on personal identity:

...in our insistent search to discover more about ourselves we become more baffled than before. We are like archaeologists who dig to discover an ancient city and find

traces and fragments of seven separate, inconsistent cultures. The only homogeneity is geographical. The cities were built on one hill. The men are within one frame.³⁴

If, then, the quest for authorisation of action from a unified subject is maintained, the requisite unity always slips away, since the object of the quest is absent. The interiority remains gestural, for life is, after all, elsewhere. But, since Nietzsche, we have been able to accept this curious absence at the heart of things. Where Whitman once said:

'Do I contradict myself?
Very well then, I contradict myself.
I am large, I contain multitudes'³⁵

we can explicitly relish the multiplicity. As Barthes put it:

It is a diffraction which is intended, a dispersion of energy in which there remains neither a central core nor a structure of meaning: I am not contradictory, I am dispersed... today the subject apprehends himself elsewhere.³⁶

But, because the quest is incompletable, there has been continual problematisation, even from within, of the philosophers' unified free agent undetermined by superficial social, historical and physical causes. Hume's account of the person as 'nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement' was for him a source of concern.³⁷ But in modern Anglo-American philosophy, theories of the self as radically contingent and dispersed abound.³⁸ Humean pessimism at the impossibility of catching the self is replaced by affirmation of

well known, 'Freud did not discover the unconscious mind: it was rather Descartes who undiscovered it.'⁴⁰ Thus both rationalist and empiricist philosophers in the interim period found the possibility of lacunae in conscious thought mystifying if not incomprehensible, a crippling theoretical handicap to the development of psychology. The associationist tradition, for example, of mechanistic explanation of chains of conscious thought, which so influenced

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the fragmented experience of flux. In the language of analytic philosophy, 'person' is not a natural kind term (like 'water' or 'tree') nor a sortal (one which provides a principle for distinguishing/counting and reidentifying particulars); it has a merely nominal rather than a real essence (although of course even the name can have real material effects).

The new concern in late 17th century philosophy to defend and find criteria for subjecthood intertwined consciousness and identity to produce a mythical centre, an illusory origination of action. Thought becomes necessarily conscious: 'no proposition can be said to be in the mind,' says Locke, 'which it never knew, which it was never yet conscious of.'³⁹ Of course, as is

romanticism through Coleridge and political thought through the Mills, ultimately lacked coherence as a psychology just because it failed to account for the very incoherence, the gappiness, of mental life. Psychologies of consciousness and subjectivity had little to contribute; the non-physical mind, defined only by what it is not, exerted only a powerfully conservative influence on theory and society.

3.1 Effects II: memory room

No, Socrates did not have this eye, the unhappy Nietzsche may have been the only man before him [Van Gogh] to have had this look that undresses the soul, that releases the body from the soul, that lays bare the body of man, beyond the subterfuges of the mind.

Antonin Artaud⁴¹

Scientific psychology is incompatible with substance dualism. If the mind is an immaterial substance, either interacting or running in parallel with the body, two related consequences follow. Firstly, scientific investigation is necessarily incomplete. There is at least one dimension of creation, in addition to the supernatural deity, which is necessarily inaccessible to

natural science. Secondly, the study of mind is necessarily unscientific. Psychology is defined out of natural science.

Despite the overwhelming and immediate success of the new sciences after Galileo's and Descartes' mathematisation of kinematics and Newton's new dynamics, psychology was, then, effectively paralysed, the mind being the only phenomenon other than God to resist the advance of the natural sciences. Isolated materialist theories of mind, suggested by La Mettrie, Priestley and Condillac, met widespread philosophical and ethical opposition. Yet there was also an extreme internal tension in the deterministic Newtonian world-view as systematised in 19th century philosophies of science, one which excluded the recalcitrant will of the rational agent from its ideals of universal causal explanation. The rational mind of the male scientist was not part of the (female) world of nature, but rather the non-natural, non-material instrument of insertion into,

6 Behaviourism was one of those research programmes, suffering from a naive kind of physics-envy, responsible for prevalent 20th century reactions against technological and theoretical scientism. 9

and subjugation of, that world.⁴²

Yet, again, these distinctions were internally problematised even before the social and political role of 'reason as despotic enlightenment' became clear.⁴³ One strand: as well as support for the Humean 'bundle theory' of personal identity and for associationist materialism, periodic recrudescences of vitalism and animism occurred even among physiologists through the 18th and early 19th centuries. The Stahlians, for instance, who theorised all bodily functions, conscious or not, voluntary or not, as continually under the sway of an active soul, can be seen as one of a number of rejections of the Cartesian programme of automatising the body and allowing only purely mental processes to the uniquely rational soul. Vitalism, Foucault

has suggested, need not be accepted as true or even as indispensable to the life sciences for us to see it as a pointer to as yet unresolved theoretical problems left over from the too swift mechanisation of the vital functions.⁴⁴ In Canguilhem's words, it is best understood as: 'an exigency rather than a method, a morality ['morale'] rather than a theory'.⁴⁵

But once psychology became established as an independent discipline in Germany and America in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, such cautions rapidly disappeared. American behaviourism denied not only the integrity of 'consciousness' for scientific psychology but also the respectability of appealing to any internal cognitive states and processes in the explanation of action. Behaviourism was one of those research programmes, suffering from a naive kind of physics-envy, responsible for prevalent 20th century reactions against technological and theoretical scientism. Overreaction to dualism in turn produces an overreaction to crude physicalism. Not only in New Age rediscoveries of the inner self is this spiral apparent; confusion about what to make of modern work in the sciences of mind, and whether or not to reject them as still irretrievably dominated by the unanalysed assumptions of exploitative empirical science, is obvious among a variety of postmodern accounts of mind, thought and subject.

I conclude with cautious remarks about one common theoretical desire. This we can characterise as the need to find memory room, in two senses: the historical sense of overcoming forgetfulness of our physiology, and the spatial sense of rendering corporeally and physically intelligible such mental/physiological functions and processes as memory itself.

In practice this means refusing to ignore the current states of the sciences of the mind. Thus, an assimilation of historical, biological and social factors into fuller, naturalistically plausible philosophical psychologies will acknowledge that thought and consciousness *have* somehow come to inhere in Artaud's 'world made up solely of warring elements'.

Of course, as Mary Douglas warned,

'the whole universe is harnessed to men's attempts to force one another into good citizenship' but this realisation does not entail the abandonment of taxonomies.⁴⁶ Categories and concepts are the products of motivated subjects, to be sure, but the most fruitful strategy after this is accepted is, perhaps, that of multiplying alternative taxonomies in theoretical profusion. It is certainly harder to take the approach of a genealogist or a sociologist of knowledge when addressing one's own sciences, for their propositions will inevitably seem to have a uniquely referential character. But if we take excellence of theory as our best measure of ontology, the apparently referential character of science can be accepted as the inevitable result of our reliance on present theory for pragmatic success, rather than as signifying some metaphysical correspondence with an independently known reality.⁴⁷ Different versions of psychoanalytic psychology, or of neuro-philosophical psychology, are no less theoretical and ideological than Cartesian dualism or any other account of thought; but unless theory about mental processes is to be given up altogether, we will go on evaluating and employing these or other ways of talking.

So, from this perspective, the mind/body problem is a pseudo-problem. Not because the relation is understood, or because there were no real problems there, but because the problems are too multifarious to be accommodated within a naive two level hierarchy. There are no privileged referents even for the terms 'the mental' and 'the physical' (does the latter refer to neurophysiological drive structures, cell assemblies, synapses, molecules or quarks?). There is not a chasm, but a continuum, between psychology, neurophysiology and particle physics.⁴⁸

After the departure of thought from the Cartesian non-physical mind – the

undressing of the soul – an inspection of the marks it left during its 300 year stay there is salutary. Of course, history has its disadvantages as well as its uses. Making too much room for memory and past debates can burden and chain. Action requires a certain obliviousness, in theory as well as in life. Yet sometimes the weight of remembering can be borne alongside the lightness of forgetting. If self-conscious thought is 'a luxury of peacetime', we will use whatever social and theoretical peacetime space we find to challenge existing norms by way of argument, history, memory, and physiology.

Many philosophers of mind still privilege rational agency, and a psychology of belief, desire and intention in the explanation of apparently purposive action. Common sense psychology is to be defended against reductionists, eliminativists and neurophilosophers. In addition, as Patricia Churchland complains, 'the philosophical tradition of veneration for language has led to a kind of fetishism with respect to logic and inference as the model for mental processes'.⁴⁹ The 'folk psychology' defended so earnestly is not just belief/desire psychology; it also includes assumptions about rationality, truth, reference, free will, personal identity, moral responsibility and autonomous agency. Of course, as Hegel knew, you only refute what you replace. So, a multiplicity of new fictions and replacement stories for post-analytic western philosophy, seeking an alternative imaginary after the death and long drawn-out burial of its soul.

Brecht again:

We ask you expressly to discover
That what happens all the time is not natural.
For to say that something is natural
In such times of bloody confusion
Of ordained disorder, of systematic arbitrariness
Of inhuman inhumanity is to
Regard it as unchangeable.⁵⁰

- 1 Antonin Artaud, 'Van Gogh, the Man Suicided by Society' [1947], in Susan Sontag (ed), *Selected Writings*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1976, p 505. I owe this reference to Patrick Nolan.
- 2 Huw Price, *Facts and the Function of Truth*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1988, p 132.
- 3 Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', in P Rabinow (ed), *The Foucault Reader*, Pantheon, New York, 1984, p 77.
- 4 Bertholt Brecht, 'The Exception and the Rule', in *The Measures Taken and Other Lehrstucke*, Eyre Methuen, London, 1988, p 44.
- 5 Artaud, 'Van Gogh, the Man Suicided by Society' p 490.
- 6 Peter Brook, *The Shifting Point*, Methuen, London, 1988, p 44.
- 7 William Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, M R Riddle (ed), Methuen, London, 1954, V.ii.218-220.

- 8 Francis Barker, *The Tremulous Private Body*, Methuen, London, 1984, pp 14-21; Catherine Belsey, *The Subject of Tragedy*, Methuen, London, 1985, Ch 2.
- 9 Ben Jonson, *Sejanus*, GA Wilkes (ed), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, V.798, 842-3.
- 10 John Ford, *'Tis Pity She's a Whore*, K Sturgess (ed), Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1970, V.vi.33-4.
- 11 Barker, *The Tremulous Private Body*, p 22.
- 12 [1609]; reprinted in C C Mish (ed), *Short Fiction of the Seventeenth Century*, New York University Press, New York, 1963. Compare John Webster, *The White Devil*, D C Gunby (ed), Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972, II.1.396 ('Let him cleave to her and both rot together') and the wonderful development of the same idea in Howard Barker's 1985 play *The Castle*.
- 13 Belsey, *The Subject of Tragedy*, Chs 2 and 4; John Dollimore, *Radical Tragedy*, Harvester, Brighton, 1984, especially Chs 1, 5, 10, 16.
- 14 Webster, *The White Devil*, V.vi.256.
- 15 Belsey, *The Subject of Tragedy*, Ch 2.
- 16 Thomas Hobbes, *Human Nature*, in W Molesworth (ed), *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, London, 1839-45, IV.31.
- 17 John Sutton, 'Religion and the Failures of Determinism' in Stephen Gaukroger (ed), *The Uses of Antiquity: the Scientific Revolution and the Classical Tradition*, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1991 (forthcoming).
- 18 Rene Descartes, 'Dedicatory Letter' to the *Meditations*.
- 19 S Gaukroger, *Cartesian Logic*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1989, Ch 2.
- 20 Robert K French, *Robert Whytt, The Soul and Medicine*, Wellcome Institute, London, 1969, Chs 8-12; John W Yolton, *Thinking Matter*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1984.
- 21 Lucien Goldmann, *The Hidden God*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1964, p 32.
- 22 Keith Hutchison, 'Supernaturalism and the Mechanical Philosophy', *History of Science*, 21, 1983.
- 23 Thomas Hobbes, 'Body', in Molesworth (ed), Vol 1.
- 24 Hobbes, 'Leviathan', Ch 46; Samuel I Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1962.
- 25 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air-pump*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985; N Malcolm, 'Hobbes and the Royal Society', in GA J Rogers and AJ Ryan (eds), *Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1988.
- 26 Pepys, quoted in Barker, *The Tremulous Private Body*, p 3.
- 27 Raymond Williams, *Keywords*, 2nd edn, Flamingo, London, 1976, pp 162-3.
- 28 Kathy V Wilkes, 'Is Consciousness Important?', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 35, 1984; '- , yishi, duh, um and consciousness' in A Marcel and E J Bisiach (eds), *Consciousness in Contemporary Science*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1988.
- 29 For more detail on 17th century usage see also Udo Thiel, 'Cudworth and Seventeenth Century Theories of Consciousness', in Stephen Gaukroger (ed), *The Uses of Antiquity: the Scientific Revolution and the Classical Tradition*.
- 30 Patricia Smith Churchland, 'Consciousness - the Transmutation of a Concept', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 64, 1983, p 92.
- 31 John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II.xxvii.
- 32 Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, I.i.2.
- 33 As quoted in Patricia Smith Churchland, 'Consciousness - the Transmutation of a Concept', p 83.
- 34 James Kennaway, *The Cost of Living Like This*, Longmans, London, 1969.
- 35 Walt Whitman, 'Song of Myself 51', in Robert Creeley (ed), *Whitman*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973.
- 36 Roland Barthes, *Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes*, Richard Howard (trans), MacMillan, London, 1977, pp 143, 168.
- 37 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, I.iv.6.
- 38 Derek Parfit, 'Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons', in Colin Blakemore and Susan Greenfield (eds), *Mindwaves*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1987; *Reasons and Persons*, 2nd edn, Clarendon, Oxford, 1984 especially pp 502-3 and Chs 10-15; Daniel C Dennett, 'The Self as the Center of Narrative Gravity', in P Cole, D Johnson and F Kessel (eds), *Consciousness and Self*, Praeger, New York, 1989.
- 39 Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, I.ii.5.
- 40 Kathy V Wilkes, *Real People*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1988, p 81.
- 41 Artaud, 'Van Gogh, the Man Suicided by Society', p 509.
- 42 Carolyn Merchant, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution*, Harper and Row, New York, 1980; Lorraine J Daston, 'The Theory of Will and the Science of Mind', in W Woodward and M G Ash (eds), *The Problematic Science: Psychology in Nineteenth Century Thought*, Praeger, New York, 1982; Brian Easlea, 'The Masculine Image of Science, with Special Reference to Physics: How Much Does Gender Really Matter?', in J Harding (ed), *Perspectives on Gender and Science*, Falmer, London, 1986.
- 43 Michel Foucault, 'Georges Canguilhem: philosopher of error', *Ideology and Consciousness* 7, 1980, p 54.
- 44 Foucault, 'Georges Canguilhem: philosopher of error', p 58.
- 45 Georges Canguilhem, *La Connaissance de la Vie*, quoted in Foucault, 'Georges Canguilhem: philosopher of error', p 58.
- 46 Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966, Ch 3.
- 47 Note that this does not entail transcendental idealism. The position is similar to that given a sophisticated development in Huw Price's *Facts and the Function of Truth*. Price rejects the project of analysing truth and instead gives an explanatory, genealogical account of why speakers have come to have such a notion as truth. He sees reality as a social construction, while rejecting idealism. See also Daniel Stoljar, 'The History of Truth', *Hermes Papers*, University of Sydney Union, 1990.
- 48 Compare Oliver Sacks, 'Reminiscence', in *The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat*, Picador, London, 1986, especially pp 140-41. For introductory suggestions as to the kind of positive accounts I have in mind, see for example Paul M Churchland, *Matter and Consciousness*, 2nd edn, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988; Patricia Smith Churchland, 'Epistemology in an Age of Neuroscience', *Journal of Philosophy* 84, 1987; Andy Clark, *Microcognition*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989.
- 49 Patricia Smith Churchland, *Neurophilosophy*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986, p 380.
- 50 Brecht, 'The Exception and the Rule', p 44.