

## 5. Place and memory: History, cognition, phenomenology

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### 1. Geographies of mind in place

If remembering, feeling, decision-making and other “psychological” processes are by nature *animated* or *embodied* processes, then the geography of embodiment also includes a geography of mind. And if, further, such cognitive and affective processes are *distributed* and *ecological* processes, in that they sometimes spread across brain, body, and world,<sup>1</sup> then human minds are partly geographical or environmental in nature.

On this view, historically and culturally unique landscapes, architectures, technologies, and ecologies are not always simply external to our mental life, not merely settings and stimuli *for* thought on the one hand, and one of many kinds of thing to think *about* on the other.

Instead, in certain circumstances the places we inhabit can partly *constitute* the processes and activities of feeling, remembering, and so on. As John Haugeland argues, the intelligence involved in our ability to navigate (for example) lies partly in our roads and paths.<sup>2</sup> This can remain true even through significant change in the nature of those roads and in the technological and cultural resources by means of which we interact with them: the widespread adoption of GPS and other navigational devices, for example, thus brings not merely a new set of external stimuli for the same old basic internal cognitive processes to use,

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<sup>1</sup> Andy Clark, *Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Edwin Hutchins, *Cognition in the Wild* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); and Hutchins, “Cognitive Ecology,” *Topics in Cognitive Science* 2, no. 4 (2010): 705–15.

<sup>2</sup> Haugeland, “Mind Embodied and Embedded,” in *Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 207–37, 233–5.

but also transformations in those (distributed) processes themselves. Over time, the diverse components and resources of the natural and constructed lifeworlds which complement our biopsychosocial human nature can become parts of enduring but dynamic distributed ecologies. Such ecologies ground the emotional and cognitive practices of small groups and communities as well as individuals.

When people's ways of inhabiting places are fairly stable, involving more or less regular cycles of activities, tasks, or routines, their sense of belonging may be more or less taken for granted in the seamless experience of ongoing embodied interaction in accustomed locations and settings.<sup>3</sup> Work and worship, love and play, storytelling and dreaming, death and burial—life's events are set in and attached to found and built environments. This means that both the emotions and the memories of these lived and shared events may, for the people involved, inhere partly in the places where they happened—in or around offices or hilltops, parks or street corners, footpaths or fields, and rippling out into larger landscapes and connected locations. In a modern Western office or an early modern village, in agricultural or industrial or mountainous or maritime environs, the geography of embodiment is also psychological—affective and mnemonic—through and through. Spatial mobility in its more comfortable or voluntary forms can support or actively transform individual and group identity. It helps us to anchor lifetime periods and memories in distinct places and phases, and to embed the evaluations and narratives with which we make sense of our past and

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<sup>3</sup> What counts as stability is itself historically and culturally variable (see Iain Chambers, *Migrancy, Culture, Identity* [London: Routledge, 1994]), and as I note below norms of mobility were in flux in early modern England. A flexible model of place memory will have very distinctive instantiations, and must be sensitive to significant local variation.

present in spatial frames of reference.<sup>4</sup> Paul Ricoeur describes the connected and communal aspects of place memory thus:

The memory of having inhabited some house in some town or that of having traveled in some part of the world are particularly eloquent and telling. They weave together an intimate memory and one shared by those close to one. In memories of this type, corporeal space is immediately linked with the surrounding space of the environment, some fragment of inhabitable land, with its more or less accessible paths, its more or less easy to cross obstacles.<sup>5</sup>

But for these same reasons, disruption to or in a local lifeworld is likewise cognitive and emotional as well as social and practical. When customary places are destroyed or disrupted, or when individuals, families, or entire groups are forced off their land or out of their homes or cities, the consequent loss and alienation has many strands. Displacement can overwhelm social bonds and the integrity of the person or group. In the extreme, the traumas of displacement are cognitive and affective as well as practical and economic, because place is so deeply integrated into mind and memory.<sup>6</sup>

My primary aim in this essay is a big-picture and preliminary exploration of the nature of embodied place memory, in and through the specific historical context of early modern

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<sup>4</sup> Emily Keightley and Michael Pickering, *Memory and the Management of Change: Repossessing the Past* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave, 2017); and Igor Knez, "Place and the Self: An Autobiographical Memory Synthesis," *Philosophical Psychology* 27, no. 2 (2014): 164–92.

<sup>5</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 148, quoted in Andy Wood, *The Memory of the People: Custom and Popular Senses of the Past in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 282.

<sup>6</sup> David Seamon, "Lived Bodies, Place, and Phenomenology: Implications for Human Rights and Environmental Justice," *Journal of Human Rights and the Environment* 4, no. 2 (2013): 143–66.

England. I build most immediately on a recent wave of cultural histories of landscape in this period. Wonderfully detailed integrative studies of embodied geographies by Nicola Whyte and Andy Wood, in particular, bring to bear extraordinarily rich and diverse source material on continuities and changes in early modern English practices of and attitudes toward place.<sup>7</sup> Although their work builds on and intersects with other cultural histories of landscape and memory centered upon specific religious and historical contexts,<sup>8</sup> this is a distinctive and creative strand of social and cultural history focusing on *vernacular* memory and custom and on *popular* senses of the past in place.

Historians like Whyte and Wood thematize memory directly, drawing out different aspects of what Wood calls “topographies of remembrance” and engaging in productive dialogue with memory studies in other areas of the social sciences.<sup>9</sup> They set issues of landscape, place, and memory in early modern England in comparative context, tapping relevant work in anthropology, archaeology, and other areas of history to pick out both patterns across and unique features within distinct cultural and historical contexts. In the next section I extract from the work of Whyte and Wood a set of characteristics of what I will call “place memory” in early modern England, a notion I elucidate as we go. The emerging picture of the lifeworlds of place in early modern England is fascinating in its own right, but also

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<sup>7</sup> Whyte, *Inhabiting the Landscape: Place, Custom and Memory, 1500–1800* (Oxford: Windgather, 2009); and Wood, *Memory of the People*.

<sup>8</sup> Alexandra Walsham, *The Reformation of the Landscape: Religion, Identity, and Memory in Early Modern Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Daniel R. Woolf, *The Social Circulation of the Past: English Historical Culture, 1500–1730* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

<sup>9</sup> See Wood, “Topographies of Remembrance,” in *The Memory of the People*, chap. 4, 188–246.

productive for other inquiries into the geography and phenomenology of embodied place memory.<sup>10</sup>

This scholarly work on the cultural history of place does not stretch to consider the places and embedded customs under discussion as parts of distributed *cognitive* ecologies. This is perhaps not surprising, given historians' understandable reluctance to cede ground to psychological approaches which have often seemed unhelpfully individualist, universalizing, and anachronistic. But a kind of cognitive history based on the idea of distributed cognitive ecologies can produce both benefits and surprises. This contemporary framework integrates critiques of individualism which have emerged within mainstream cognitive science with constructive alternative theories and case studies of situated and socially distributed cognition in the wild.<sup>11</sup> Historical and cultural variation in mental processes themselves, not just in their cues and settings, is both encompassed and actively predicted by these approaches, which for

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<sup>10</sup> Edward S. Casey, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); David Seamon, "Situated Cognition and the Phenomenology of Place: Lifeworld, Environmental Embodiment, and Immersion-in-World," *Cognitive Processing* 16, no. S1 (2015), S389–S392; and Mick Smith, "Somewhere in the North of England': A Recollective Ecology," *Emotions: History, Culture, Society* 1, no. 1 (2017): 137–60. Other work in cultural geography effectively evokes personal and affective experiences of and in landscapes, but likewise displays less interest in psychology, even of a situated or distributed kind: see for example John Wylie, "A Single Day's Walking: Narrating Self and Landscape on the South West Coast Path", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 30, no. 2 (2005): 234–247.

<sup>11</sup> Hutchins, *Cognition in the Wild*; Andy Clark, *Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede, eds., *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Paul Griffiths and Andrea Scarantino, "Emotions in the Wild," in Robbins and Aydede, eds., *Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*, 454–66; Kourken Michaelian and John Sutton, "Distributed Cognition and Memory Research: History and Current Directions," *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 4, no. 1 (2013), 1–24; John Sutton, "Shared Remembering and Distributed Affect: Varieties of Psychological Interdependence", in Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus, and Denis Perrin, eds., *New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory* (London: Routledge, 2018), 181-199; and Steven D. Brown and Paula Reavey, "Memory in the Wild" (forthcoming).

some years now have been applied and extended in early modern literary and cultural history.<sup>12</sup>

So I also aim to develop, defend, and extend the treatment of cognitive history by way of distributed cognitive ecologies. Among a number of productive recent critical engagements with this framework,<sup>13</sup> I pick out concerns expressed concisely by Adam Rzepka in the course of a brilliant discussion of the imaginative production of place and places on the Shakespearean stage.<sup>14</sup> Rzepka identifies two methodological challenges to distributed cognition as an historical framework, both turning on anachronism. Firstly, he contends that the theory “does not reflect psychological theories current in the [early modern] period,” thus neglecting historical actors’ self-understandings and threatening “a persistent fissure” between theory and archaeology or history.<sup>15</sup> Secondly, Rzepka worries that theorists of distributed cognition fail to implement their own wish to maintain or add a focus on mind and mental life to standard historical materialist attention to bodies and power: by engaging primarily with the humoral and physiological aspects of memory and mind, he suggests, we

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<sup>12</sup> Evelyn B. Tribble, *Cognition in the Globe: Attention and Memory in Shakespeare’s Theatre* (New York: Palgrave, 2011); John Sutton, “Spongy Brains and Material Memories,” in *Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England*, ed. Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan Jr. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), 14–34; Tribble and Sutton, “Cognitive Ecology as a Framework for Shakespearean Studies,” *Shakespeare Studies* 39 (2011): 94–103; Laurie Johnson, John Sutton, and Evelyn B. Tribble, eds., *Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare’s Theatre: the Early Modern Body-Mind* (London: Routledge, 2014); Andrew Bozio, “Embodied Thought and the Perception of Place in *King Lear*,” *SEL Studies in English Literature 1500–1900* 55, no. 2 (2015): 263–84; and Sutton and Nicholas Keene, “Cognitive History and Material Culture,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Material Culture in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Catherine Richardson, Tara Hamling, and David Gaimster (London: Routledge, 2017), 44–56.

<sup>13</sup> See James A. Knapp, “Beyond Materiality in Shakespeare Studies,” *Literature Compass* 11, no. 10 (2014): 677–90.

<sup>14</sup> Rzepka, “‘How easy is a bush supposed a bear?’: Differentiating Imaginative Production in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 66, no. 3 (2015): 308–28.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 327–28. See also Evelyn B. Tribble and John Sutton, “Minds in and out of Time: Memory, Embodied Skill, Anachronism, and Performance,” *Textual Practice* 26, no. 4 (2012): 587–607.

merely reprise an older “insistence on materialism” and cannot achieve a genuine “return to psychology” (312, 328). Commenting briefly on the first challenge along the way, and on the second in the essay’s final section, I aim to underline the point that doing this kind of cognitive history does not entail the step-by-step application of one master discourse to a passive recipient field. Indeed, I use historical considerations about place and memory to challenge psychology to move further and faster into the wild, to begin to address some more tangled aspects of the operations and practices of remembering in the real world, in a mode of interdisciplinary communication which seeks mutual benefits and surprises.<sup>16</sup> The general investigation into place memory encourages attention to some familiar enough interactions between remembering, imagining, and perceiving which are as yet rarely acknowledged in cognitive theory and experiment.

Rzepka’s challenges also point us toward another key source domain, the humoralist literary analysis of Renaissance and early modern works led by Gail Kern Paster, which mixes phenomenological and body criticism.<sup>17</sup> Not only has this form of literary humoralism rightly set its porous bodies, permeable minds, and swirling passions in the dynamic environments and ecologies within which fragile fluid equilibrium might be sought,<sup>18</sup> but it has also for some time rightly treated cognitive theorists like Andy Clark and Edwin Hutchins in a spirit

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<sup>16</sup> John Sutton and Evelyn B. Tribble, “The Creation of Space: Narrative Strategies, Group Agency, and Skill in Lloyd Jones’s *The Book of Fame*,” in *Mindful Aesthetics: Literature and the Sciences of Mind*, ed. Chris Danta and Helen Groth (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 141–60. Cf. Felicity Callard and Des Fitzgerald, *Rethinking Interdisciplinarity across the Social Sciences and Neurosciences* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015).

<sup>17</sup> Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Paster, “Nervous Tension: Networks of Blood and Spirit in the Early Modern Body,” in *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe*, ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio (London: Routledge, 1997), 107–25; and Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, eds. *Reading the Early Modern Passions* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

<sup>18</sup> Mary Floyd-Wilson, *English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Paster, *Humoring the Body*.

of potential alliance rather than entrenched hostility. Just as Paster invokes Clark's account of "continuous reciprocal causation" to catch the ceaseless exchange of fluids and elemental materials between body and world that characterizes the early modern ecology of the passions,<sup>19</sup> so Clark in turn puts Evelyn B. Tribble's historico-ecological analysis of Renaissance acting practices into play for his audience as independent evidence for distributed cognition.<sup>20</sup> As well as restating the mutual appeal of distributed cognition for literary humoralists, I aim, finally, to indicate the potential for new and integrative contact between the treatments of place and memory in both cultural histories and literary humoralism, by way of the latter's turn towards an ecology of the passions.<sup>21</sup>

## *2. Lifeworlds of place in early modern England*

Despite new levels of mobility in early modern English society—connected to economic, political, and demographic changes—significant practices of both personal and shared remembering continued to be anchored in specific and experienced places. Even as technologies and strategies for dealing with past and future altered, memory was still richly scaffolded by landscapes, artifacts, architecture, and institutions which all themselves bore the traces of cultural intervention.

In a selective synthesis of the view of place memory emerging from the recent cultural histories, I draw in particular on Andy Wood's account of "the memory of the people," based

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<sup>19</sup> Paster, *Humoring the Body*, 10, 34.

<sup>20</sup> Clark, *Supersizing the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 63–64. See also John Sutton, *Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Sutton, "Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process," in *The Extended Mind*, ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 189–225.

<sup>21</sup> Paster, *Humoring the Body*.

in large part on depositions and witness statements in the records of litigation from disputes in customary law.<sup>22</sup> This material affords Wood rich opportunity to delineate subtle markers of continuity and change. On the one hand, for much of the early modern period, local activities of remembering in specific environments and settings remained in many ways stable: many a customary practice still seemed to unfold as it had for time out of mind, same as it ever was. On the other hand, this depositional evidence reveals that “a clear majority” of witnesses “appear to have been migrants” who had known their current community and environs only from the age of sixteen or later: yet they typically claim, and are typically granted to have appropriate experience of or expertise in local customs (38). This sense of the cultural flexibility of remembrance drives Wood’s vision of the many ways in which shared stories and individual memory could be integrated and entangled. The following sketch goes beyond Wood’s explicit theorizing to schematize and distill some central features of his account.

Firstly, place memory in early modern England is *social*, or at least naturally integrates individual and social practices of remembering, and is “embedded in key sites, productive of a sense of remembered place that underwrites collectivities” (10). The kind of collectivity in question is primarily the small group or local community, not the larger groups often studied in contemporary social theories of “collective memory.” Wood sets aside accounts of collective memory as homogeneous or as itself intrinsically tending towards convergence (15–29), and focuses on the vital role of shared or similar embodied experiences in particular places and settings in shaping and sustaining popular senses of the past. Place memory is social too in its functions, with the search for a “usable past” always driven by present concerns or disputes, for example about boundaries or access rights. The sociality of place

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<sup>22</sup> Wood, *Memory of the People*, 29–42.

memory is both synchronic and diachronic. On the one hand, at particular times of change or dispute, interpretations of customary practice or of land use were negotiated communally, within or across groups with more aligned or more competing interests. On the other hand, both stories and activities were repeated over decades and generations, as older people told what they had done and heard in the same settings in their youth. In 1738, for example, a 92-year-old Yorkshireman called Christopher Slater recalled being given at the age of 12 a green ribbon by which to remember the boundary stones of Melmerby and Aggerthorpe, an imperative impressed on him those eighty years earlier by “old Antient Men” who declared that these ‘Boulder stones . . . had been so riden all their time and as they had heard old people declare before them”—as Wood notes, such memories “interlocked community, place and custom . . . to cascade memories down the generations” (209).<sup>23</sup> An important subsidiary feature in Wood’s account is that the retrieval of place memory, often public and shared in these ways, is not mindless or entirely implicit: even though the fit between embodied memories and place is often seamless enough to remain unremarked, its exercise was in context often an explicit and deliberate part of a search for a usable past, rather than an automatic or unconscious one (14).

Secondly, place memory is *dynamic*, both in sustaining contested or variable accounts of past and place, and in being always open to renegotiation and reevaluation. It was not imposed on the people by authorities, or in any linear way increasingly centralized or driven by newly universalizing national narratives. For example, in a striking reinterpretation of evidence on surveying and cartography, Wood rejects the idea that elite commodifying impulses flattened or reduced local difference and corralled landscapes into a single, precisely mapped grid. Far

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. Philip Schwyzer, “Lees and Moonshine: Remembering Richard III, 1485–1635,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 63, no. 3 (2010): 850–83.

from devaluing vernacular memories, new cartographic practices actively relied on and cooperated with popular memory. Surveyors typically consulted and collaborated, more or less effectively, with local informants whose lifelong experience was essential in delineating boundaries or characterizing customary usage of land. Documents attesting to “this active popular engagement in cartography” reveal a “complex interplay of dominant and subordinate” interests (188–200). In contexts of conflict or disruption, questions of legitimacy or custom made it more urgent to deploy shared memories in service of particular aims: claims that particular practices had been in place since “time out of mind” only needed to be made explicit when they were under threat. Wood’s own grand narrative does drive on into later periods of “ecological alienation” in which more systematic enclosure produced an awful dissonance between the remembered local world and what it had later become, identifying a “placelessness that permeated the memories” of older people who lived on into times after land and communities “had been carved up” (236–246, 341–351). But, as he notes, the ongoing dynamism of place memory remained in various forms of popular resistance and vernacular counter-memory, with those lands and those communities alive in shared memory and resonant with shared emotion.

Thirdly, place memory is active and practical, or *embodied*. Place is powerful in memory, as Edward S. Casey argues, by way of the orienting function of the lived body (1987, 181–215).<sup>24</sup> In early modern lifeworlds of place, the setting for major events in English communities remained across generations “an inhabited, known landscape, one walked across, worked on, ploughed over, dug into. It is a taskscape, a vernacular vision of the land

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<sup>24</sup> Casey, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 181–215.

and its past.”<sup>25</sup> Place memory was encoded and sedimented or consolidated, for individuals and their groups, through iterative and repetitive activity. Working and walking the land brought deep embodied familiarity not only with particular places but also with the events and stories associated with them at a fine-grained level that may not be easy for many of us to grasp. Through constantly acting in and on the land, early modern people were “reading, monitoring and remembering change in the local world down to its most precise details” (229). These rhythms of embodied interaction operated at a range of timescales, including those of season, calendar, and religious ritual, and their operations effaced distinctions between enculturated natural features like trees, ditches, or rivers and wilded artifacts like crosses, ruins, or mounds.<sup>26</sup> Economically and ideologically salient practices like the marking of parochial boundaries in perambulation afforded particular embodied experiences.<sup>27</sup> As groups walked visible or conceptual lines between “marks set for remembrance,” a youth might be struck or have his head knocked on a stone “to make him the better to remember that the same stone was a boundary stone.”<sup>28</sup> To pain, food, and drink might be added further mnemonic sensory cues, such as hands laid on textured surfaces: local custom as social memory was heard, performed, and felt (208).<sup>29</sup> Wood’s tempting descriptions of such early modern practices as “the deliberate imprinting of an often complex mental map upon the

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<sup>25</sup> Wood, *Memory of the People*, 198. Cf. Tim Ingold, “The Temporality of Landscape,” *World Archaeology* 25, no. 2 (1993): 152–74; and Ingold, *Making: Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture* (London: Routledge, 2013).

<sup>26</sup> Walsham, *Reformation of the Landscape*, 5. Cf. Chris Gosden, “Cognitive Landscapes: The Origins of the English Village,” *Pragmatics & Cognition* 22, no. 1 (2014): 93–108, 96.

<sup>27</sup> Nicola Whyte, “Landscape, Memory and Custom: Parish Identities c. 1550–1700,” *Social History* 32, no. 2 (2007): 166–86, 175; and Whyte, *Inhabiting the Landscape*.

<sup>28</sup> Wood, *Memory of the People*, 203, 207.

<sup>29</sup> An anthropological parallel can be found in Keith H. Basso’s account of landscape and language among the Western Apache, for whom the ways that “wisdom sits in places” are impressed especially on young people urged to accompany their storytelling elders to unique and memorable places of specific significance. See Basso, *Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Apache* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), 129–143.

minds of the young” (233, cf. 248), like his suggestion that surveyors and cartographers were “converting the mental maps of local inhabitants into . . . textual products” (198), perhaps tend to overemphasize internal and individual representations of the landscape, neglecting the possibility that such “mental maps,” while complex enough, might be more distributed, substantially left out there in the environment, consisting more of practical *know-how* in unique settings than of abstracted or decontextualized *knowledge* of those settings. At the very least, the invocation of “mental maps” in histories of place and memory signals the need for more intimate and productive interaction with the cognitive sciences.<sup>30</sup>

Fourthly, place memory is mutual or *interactive*, in that the land and its features were never merely static or passive surfaces upon which human physical and conceptual activity was inscribed, but rather were always evolving, accumulating their own histories, bearing the changing traces of innumerable nonhuman as well as human actions and events. So by “place memory” I do not mean only memory *of* and *for* places; I do not mean only places as shaping cues or stimuli *to* memory, as primarily a “stimulus” or “a fillip to the task of remembering.”<sup>31</sup> I mean to suggest a dynamic reciprocal connection rather than a one-way relation,<sup>32</sup> and to treat places themselves as the physical vehicles of certain activities of remembering. Some changes in the land operate across timescales quite different from that of typical human experience, but places remain “archives of memory” which can be tapped in many different and unpredictable ways: the history of humans’ physical and narrative

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<sup>30</sup> Barbara Tversky, “Cognitive Maps, Cognitive Collages, and Spatial Mental Models,” in *Spatial Information Theory: European Conference, COSIT’93*, ed. Andrew U. Frank and Irene Campari (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1993), 14–24; and David Turnbull, “Maps Narratives and Trails: Performativity, Hodology and Distributed Knowledges in Complex Adaptive Systems—An Approach to Emergent Mapping,” *Geographical Research* 45, no. 2 (2007): 140–49.

<sup>31</sup> Walsham, *Reformation of the Landscape*, 7, 618.

<sup>32</sup> Contrast Knez, “Place and the Self,” 175.

interventions in a landscape remains in place alongside the traces of evolving longer-term environmental movements, all accretions available for potential but uncertain present or future activities and interpretations.<sup>33</sup> Interactions with the early modern English land were forms of creative and sensitive craft, not the imposition of human meaning on a static surface or the reading and conceptual ordering of a set repository. Though culturally as well as naturally constructed, the active and accumulative landscape tended to exceed or resist any particular classification. Earthworks or barrows, hillforts or boundary markers, place names or relics, for example, all had histories of their own, landmarks always accruing new meanings and stories which might overlay and interanimate earlier traces, but would rarely entirely obliterate them.<sup>34</sup>

The historians and archaeologists I've been relying on here rightly stress that both landscapes and landmarks thus have a palimpsestic character, with traces superposed on traces.<sup>35</sup> But once we also treat human memory itself as literally distributed and ecological, we can characterize mental life in the same way. Most generally, remembering is typically constructive in the sense that selective fragments of episodic, sensory, embodied experience are fluidly meshed and blended, recombined in practice and in context rather than preserved or restored.<sup>36</sup> More specifically, the enduring but dynamic resources on which such creative

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<sup>33</sup> William J. Turkel, *The Archive of Place: Unearthing the Pasts of the Chilcotin Plateau* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), xvii, 225–27.

<sup>34</sup> Cornelius Holtorf and Howard M. R. Williams, "Landscapes and Memories," in *The Cambridge Companion to Historical Archaeology*, ed. Dan Hicks and Mary C. Beaudry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 235–54; Nicola Whyte, "The Afterlife of Barrows: Prehistoric Monuments in the Norfolk Landscape," *Landscape History* 25, no. 1 (2003): 5–16; Whyte, *Inhabiting the Landscape*; Wood, *Memory of the People*, 219–36.

<sup>35</sup> Ruth M. Van Dyke and Susan E. Alcock, "Archaeologies of Memory: An Introduction," in *Archaeologies of Memory*, ed. Van Dyke and Alcock (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 1–13; and Wood, *Memory of the People*, 231–32.

<sup>36</sup> Martin A. Conway, "Memory and the Self," *Journal of Memory and Language* 53, no. 4 (2005): 594–628; David C. Rubin, "The Basic-Systems Model of Episodic Memory," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 1, no. 4 (2006): 277–311; and John Sutton,

retrieval processes draw go far beyond our biological memory processes, which are far from stable, whether thought of as volatile and constantly reconsolidating neural engrams, or as patterns of flow in the fleeting animal spirits coursing incessantly through the pores of the brain. Human remembering is distributed or ecologically scaffolded, by nature incorporating diverse bodily, social, technological, and environmental resources, partly because only such integrated but heterogeneous systems enable the partial and fallible forms of stability and continuity that mark our emotional and cultural ways of being in time.<sup>37</sup> So memory itself has a palimpsestic or superpositional character, always projecting parts of the past into the present and the future, constantly expressing and revealing and recontextualising the before in the after. And place is a particularly potent part of these extended meshworks<sup>38</sup> in part because of its distinctive temporalities—because it can combine or interfere with, support or constitute experience and memory in striking and enduring ways. I try to flesh out these claims below in suggesting that place memory integrates distinct kinds or forms of remembering, and goes beyond memory in resting on or fusing with imagination.<sup>39</sup> But first, I sum up the account of place memory I have drawn from cultural history and, in noting one specific puzzle about it, address one of the concerns I mentioned above about distributed cognition as a framework for history.

The picture of local place memory emerging from cultural history could be described as a *psycho geography* of embodiment or embodied mind. Whether simply relying on familiar

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“Remembering,” in Robbins and Aydede, eds., *Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*, 217–35.

<sup>37</sup> Sutton, “Exograms and Interdisciplinarity.”

<sup>38</sup> Tim Ingold, *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description* (London: Routledge, 2011); and Carl Knappett, “Networks of Objects, Meshworks of Things,” in *Redrawing Anthropology: Materials, Movements, Lines*, ed. Ingold (London: Routledge, 2011), 45–64.

<sup>39</sup> Emily Keightley and Michael Pickering, *The Mnemonic Imagination* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012).

pathways and environmental features as the past seamlessly animated the present, or—in times of disruption or dispute—negotiating competing accounts of local practices and customs in the search for a usable past, the mental and emotional life of early modern English people was *ecological*.<sup>40</sup>

For this reason, we might then want to try to tap and make sense of their *beliefs* about the nature of the intimate relations between bodily, cognitive, and climatic processes, and thus about their concomitant embodied *experiences*. Yet one dimension absent in the rich vision presented by Wood and the other cultural historians is the *humoral* aspect of memory and embodied thinking. As both medical and literary historians have shown:

pervasive early modern ideas about the bodily humours grounded not only conceptions of health and disease, but also dynamic understandings of temperament and character, and of what we would call psychological processes. In particular, the state of the quick and nimble animal spirits, subtle fluids derived from the blood and coursing through the brain and nerves, influenced the clarity and efficacy of reasoning, decision-making, and remembering. But because the animal spirits themselves were constantly changing, affected by places, bodily regimen, and the nature of one's passions, the mind in this ecological framework was porous, open to a variety of worldly influences.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> I mention 'psychogeography' warily here, for this general summation of the picture of place memory I've sketched, without intending the term to take substantial trans-historical weight: a reviewer asks for a definition, but its contemporary uses evoke modernist and urban contexts alien to our early modern settings. See Merlin Coverley, *Psychogeography* (London: Pocket Essentials, 2006); Tina Richardson, ed., *Walking Inside Out: Contemporary British Psychogeography* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015).

<sup>41</sup> Sutton and Keene, "Cognitive History and Material Culture," 45. See also Paster, "Nervous Tension"; Sutton, *Philosophy and Memory Traces*; and Erin Sullivan and Andrew Wear, "Materiality, Nature, and the Body," in Richardson, Hamling, and Gaimster, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Material Culture*, 137–53.

Both medical and moral practice sanctioned the systematic manipulation of the “non-naturals”: the regulation of air and climate, exercise and rest, sleep and waking, food and drink, repletion and excretion, and the passions.<sup>42</sup> The aim was to maintain appropriate dynamic balances between the external environment and the internal bodily and nervous fluids which grounded life and mind alike. In these *geohumoral* frameworks, the character and psychology of the English in particular was often seen as uniquely vulnerable to climatic influence, with brains and bodies taken to be either so moist and cold, so porous and spongy, that they absorb all influences too easily and are thus unsteady and inconstant; or so full, dammed-up, and gross as to be volatile and barbarous.<sup>43</sup>

So why do these geohumoral themes seem not to show up in the recent cultural histories of place memory? Surely the influences of *local* airs, waters, and places might be expected to ground and mark distinctive psychogeographical worlds. But the bodies and the embodied experiences apparent in, for example, Wood’s accounts of his depositions and witness statements seem at least initially to be less volatile, less phenomenologically fluctuating, than those worried over in the medical, moral, and fictional sources tapped by the literary historians of humoralism. Perhaps this is simply due to the distinctness of the respective evidence bases. Medical and literary historians have relied on published or performed texts, on Timothy Bright and Helkiah Crooke, Edmund Spenser and Robert Burton, Ben Jonson and William Shakespeare. Generally derived from and circulating among urban elites, these works contrast with the archival and legal or practical materials accessed by cultural

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<sup>42</sup> Andrew Wear, “Medicine in Early Modern Europe, 1500–1700,” in *The Western Medical Tradition, 800 BC to AD 1800*, ed. Lawrence I. Conrad, Michael Neve, Vivian Nutton, Roy Porter, and Wear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 215–361, 360; and Mary Floyd-Wilson, “English Mettle,” in Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, eds., *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, 130–46.

<sup>43</sup> Floyd-Wilson, *English Ethnicity and Race*; Floyd-Wilson, “English Mettle”; and Sutton, “Spongy Brains and Material Memories.”

historians like Whyte and Wood. Did humoral discourse and its associated phenomenologies have less of a grip at a local and practical level? Was the urge to implement “the civilizing process” associated more with emerging *national* “ethnological anxieties,” in elite attempts at the “systematic manipulation of the non-naturals,”<sup>44</sup> and less with the seasonal cycles of community life and memory across England’s diverse regions?

I do not know: these questions need to be put to the archives, with an eye to practical contexts in which ecologically anchored humoral passions might be invoked, where exchange between climate and cognition, the “dynamic reciprocities between self and environment,”<sup>45</sup> might have been seen as relevant. My hunch is that a range of forms of evidence beyond elite medical and literary sources will indeed reveal psychogeohumoral concerns and experiences at a local level too. We may find smaller stories which reveal shared early modern understandings of environmentally based psychologies and characteristics. The emotional worlds of people living on different sides of hills or moors, valleys or rivers may be seen to differ: perhaps there are early modern microclimates of affect and decision-making and constancy and trust. This is not a matter of contrasting the fantastical and imaginative world of elite dramas and fictions with a gritty popular conception of place and memory: as I will argue below, ordinary experiences of place were thoroughly imaginative too, entirely permeated by projections and wishes.

Such further investigations in historical phenomenology will also elucidate one concern about the historical relevance of distributed cognitive ecologies: as Rzepka put it, “even if objects

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<sup>44</sup> Floyd-Wilson, “English Mettle,” 140; and Gail Kern Paster, “Eschewing Politeness: Norbert Elias and the Historiography of Early Modern Affect,” *PMLA* 130, no. 5 (2015): 1443–49.

<sup>45</sup> Paster, *Humoring the Body*, 14.

[for example] functioned as participants in a ‘cognitive ecology,’ they were not understood to do so” by historical actors, or according to the “psychological theories current in the period.”<sup>46</sup> But this is too quick. An understanding of mind, memory, and character as intrinsically ecological, potentially incorporating objects, other people, and the physical environment, was indeed available in the early modern period. The humoral phenomenology which has been identified in medical and moral psychology and in drama and poetry includes, in at least some of its forms, acceptance of the mental and emotional roles and natures of artifacts and environments.<sup>47</sup> As the preceding discussion suggests, Rzepka’s concern may get a firmer grip at a vernacular level. Is there work to be done on any bodies of early modern English evidence parallel, for example, to Barbara Duden’s archaeology of women’s bodily experiences in eighteenth-century Germany?<sup>48</sup> And would such research confirm that the ecological and place-based understanding of memory and the passions identified in published works also animated popular conceptions of mind and world?

### *3. Remembered and imagined places*

Because it will help me to get at a final set of characteristics of early modern place memory, I want to spend a little more time on Rzepka’s charge that ideas about distributed cognitive

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<sup>46</sup> Rzepka, “How easy is a bush supposed a bear?,” 327–28.

<sup>47</sup> Paster, *Humoring the Body*; Evelyn B. Tribble and Nicolas Keene, *Cognitive Ecologies and the History of Remembering: Religion, Education, and Memory in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011); and Tribble and Sutton, “Cognitive Ecology as a Framework for Shakespearean Studies.” Cf. Jonathan Gil Harris, *Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); and Bruce R. Smith, *The Key of Green: Passion and Perception in Renaissance Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

<sup>48</sup> Duden, *The Woman beneath the Skin: A Doctor’s Patients in Eighteenth-Century Germany*, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

ecologies remain overly reductive, neglecting the full range of historical attitudes to mind, soul, and (especially) imagination. Rzepka asserts that in their focus on physiology and anatomy, which is exemplified in references to the animal spirits and the bodily humors, theorists of distributed cognition “have not tended to engage early modern psychological models beyond their material aspects.”<sup>49</sup> To the extent that some humanists identify any historical approach inspired by cognitive theory as overly reductionist and materialist, they have been understandably reluctant to engage in detail with such approaches. In his impressively thorough and even-handed survey of the interdisciplinary field of memory studies, Wood rightly notes that “more explicitly biological approaches to remembering have had less impact” as practitioners adopt “a social rather than a neurological reading of memory” (22). But because not all cognitive theory is in fact grimly neurological and reductionist, there are forms of cognitive history which are also more pluralist and inclusive.

I have previously argued in response to such concerns that more extreme forms of reductionism—treating mental processes as *nothing but* neural processes and explicable *only* by way of the neurosciences—are, in fields even potentially relevant for historians, extremely rare, and in particular that they are much less prevalent and damaging than the distinct individualist or internalist idea that mental processes (at whatever level they are to be explained) occur solely in the individual head.<sup>50</sup> This is perhaps no longer quite right, with the rise of so-called “ruthless” reductionism in philosophy,<sup>51</sup> the ongoing growth of applied

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<sup>49</sup> Rzepka, “How easy is a bush supposed a bear?,” 238.

<sup>50</sup> John Sutton and Evelyn B. Tribble, “Materialists Are Not Merchants of Vanishing,” *Early Modern Culture: An Electronic Seminar* 9 (2012), available at [https://www.academia.edu/1054451/Materialists\\_are\\_not\\_merchants\\_of\\_vanishing\\_Sutton\\_and\\_Tribble\\_](https://www.academia.edu/1054451/Materialists_are_not_merchants_of_vanishing_Sutton_and_Tribble_); and Sutton and Keene, “Cognitive History and Material Culture.”

<sup>51</sup> John Bickle, “Memory and Neurophilosophy,” in *The Memory Process: Neuroscientific and Humanistic Perspectives*, ed. Suzanne Nalbantian, Paul M. Matthews, and James L. McClelland (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 195–215. See also John Sutton, “Remembering as Public Practice: Wittgenstein, Memory, and Distributed Cognitive

as well as pop-science neuro-discourses such as neurolaw and neuroethics, and especially the development of more sophisticated biohistorical forensic sciences into a new history which promises to read the past off ancient DNA and microbiomes, off bones and isotopes. Such endeavours can be performed more or less effectively, and in particular do not inevitably write mind, experience, and agency out of history in the way that some overwrought and ill-informed critics fear:<sup>52</sup> for example, Robin Fleming’s biographical sketch of “Eighteen,” a seventh-century Englishwoman whose body and grave in Cambridgeshire have some intriguing and unusual features, beautifully exemplifies Fleming’s own call for rich forms of history, rich geographies of embodiment, derived from nontextual biological sources but expanding into cultural histories of place and practice.<sup>53</sup>

So it may indeed be important to keep mind, memory, and experience firmly and explicitly in focus in the coming era of biohistory, to avoid a new “mindlessness” in the humanities or in cultural geography. But the vast majority of work in cognitive theory, including especially the broadly “situated” approaches to mind and emotion within which our work on distributed cognitive ecologies is firmly embedded,<sup>54</sup> does not even flirt with the elimination of mental

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Ecologies”, in Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Annalisa Coliva, and Volker Munz, eds., *Mind, Language, and Action: Proceedings of the 36<sup>th</sup> International Wittgenstein Symposium* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), 409-443.

<sup>52</sup> David Hawkes, “Against Materialism in Literary Theory,” in *The Return of Theory in Early Modern English Studies: Tarrying with the Subjunctive*, ed. Paul Cefalu and Bryan Reynolds (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), 237–57; and Roger Cooter, “Neural Veils and the Will to Historical Critique: Why Historians of Science Need to Take the Neuro-Turn Seriously,” *Isis* 105, no. 1 (2014): 145–54.

<sup>53</sup> Fleming, “Writing Biography at the Edge of History,” *American Historical Review* 114, no. 3 (2009): 606–14.

<sup>54</sup> Robbins and Aydede, eds., *Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*; and Jan Slaby, “Mind Invasion: Situated Affectivity and the Corporate Life Hack,” *Frontiers in Psychology* 7 (2016), article 266.

life or the universalizing of the neural. Cognitive history of this type is not “neurohistory,”<sup>55</sup> for the principled reason that it sees memory and mind as distributed well beyond the brain.<sup>56</sup> While brains themselves can be aptly described as “biosocial organs permeated by history,”<sup>57</sup> cognitive history can operate on a broader canvas, in that it can address the practices, artifacts, and social processes of historically specific mental lives even where their effects on the brain cannot be directly identified.<sup>58</sup> Neither is distributed cognition at all imperialist: as I hope this essay demonstrates, it rather draws directly on, and seeks to contribute to, existing historical projects of many kinds. It is not that settled frameworks from the cognitive sciences are to be applied to history as privileged truths, but that mutual benefits can arise from the careful meeting of these approaches on topics of independent interest.<sup>59</sup>

I conclude with an attempt to push this wishful agenda a little further. I focus precisely on the core topic of Rzepka’s own essay, the imaginative production of spaces, scenes, and landscapes. Rzepka is addressing distinct modes of theatrical imagining as, in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, characters and audiences shift between the accurate “apprehension” of what is materially present on the stage, the “alteration or overlay” of what is present by imagined or remembered scenes, and the “radical abstraction from the stage required by the visualization of” the exotic landscapes conjured by Titania and Oberon (310–11). In describing the first mode, Rzepka helpfully points to a sometimes-neglected theoretical

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<sup>55</sup> Daniel Lord Smail, “An Essay on Neurohistory,” in *Emerging Disciplines: Shaping New Fields of Scholarly Inquiry in and beyond the Humanities*, ed. Melissa Bailar (Houston, TX: Rice University Press, 2010), 201–28.

<sup>56</sup> Louise Barrett, *Beyond the Brain: How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

<sup>57</sup> Stephen Cowley, “Why Brains Matter: An Integrational Perspective,” *Language Sciences* 24, no. 1 (2002): 73–95, 75; and Daniel Lord Smail, *On Deep History and the Brain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

<sup>58</sup> Sutton and Keene, “Cognitive History and Material Culture.”

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

tradition in which imagination is involved not just in fantasy or hallucination but also in accurate perception, filling in and filling out the experienced world not so much representationally as “presentationally.” In the second mode, remembered scenes evoked by the characters, such as Hermia’s recollection of childhood idylls lazing with Helena “upon faint primrose beds,” support or overlay what we see in the play’s real time, in an amending or additive form of imaginative work. The final mode invokes both orderly and familiar topographies and disfigured envisioned landscapes, as the fairy quarrel skips across and flips rapidly between multiple evoked places, from “a capsule survey of the English countryside” to the wildest far-flung places, in imaginative work which hints “at loosening the restrictions of location itself” (313–323).

It is true that we always love and quarrel, play and suffer, in specific settings. But in fully occupying or inhabiting these places, alone and together, in perception and later in memory alike, we are not entirely bound by “the restrictions of location.” Rzepka treats theater, and *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* in particular, as a particularly concentrated imaginative producer of place. But he also rightly sees these distinctive modes of imagining as exemplifying a broader “functional distribution” of the complex and multiple early modern psyche, able to “foster immersions in wholly immaterial worlds” (like those imagined and enacted in the *Dream*) outside the theater too (328). After all, dreams and imaginings—insubstantial as they may seem—often persist as traces, not subject to erasure, with joyous or disruptive causal powers of their own. So I can, finally, offer some preliminary thoughts on the roles of imagination and play in and alongside (historical) place memory, taking up Rzepka’s invitation to acknowledge the persistence of imaginary remainders in the quotidian world (327). To get to the work of imagination in place memory, I first look at the interanimation of multiple forms of remembering.

Distinct but complementary modes of remembering operate in the retrieval and transmission of place memory. Wood stresses that past events or narratives could be activated through visual, verbal, and written expressions, which are more often reinforcing or feeding off each other than conflicting and competing (247–71). Again, we can extend the point psychologically, to bring the same insight back to bear on multimodality within memory itself. Recall of personally experienced episodes mingles with repeated or generic shared experience, or with more schematic knowledge of how things have always or usually been in particular places. Whyte notes that specific instances of the burial or exchange of bodies at parochial boundaries in some cases later became smoothed out and incorporated into more generic and communally accepted tales, as idiosyncratic moments became part, sometimes long after the event, of social systems of memory.<sup>60</sup> For Wood, the repeated stories which tied communities together could easily take on a vicarious mode, often not having or needing a single original author: the dense web of shared memories includes many narratives which have been performed or reenacted many times over, because and by way of others' prior acts of remembrance (271–86).

These tight interanimations of personal and shared memory, and of episodic and semantic forms of remembering, can often be most clearly identified at work within unique settings and communities of practice. Even where philosophers and psychologists of memory pay lip service to the importance of interaction between these forms of remembering, their attention rarely stretches beyond the attempt to analyze each distinctly in order to address their interanimation in practice.<sup>61</sup> Place is not just a vital catalyst for these ways of fusing or

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<sup>60</sup> Whyte, "Landscape, Memory and Custom."

<sup>61</sup> Jeffrey P. Toth and R. Reed Hunt, "Not One Versus Many, but Zero Versus Any: Structure and Function in the Context of the Multiple Memory Systems Debate," in *Memory: Systems,*

overlaying various forms of remembrance. It is often itself one element in the distributed system, affording easy multimodal projection onto and across well-known locations and features for those who inhabited their land in such customary and deeply embedded ways. For Whyte, local landscape features were also integrated into complex mnemonic systems. The traditions of boundary marking and landmark noting were not simply enacted on ritual occasions like the perambulations of Rogation week, but were also woven in to many familiar but unique local ways of recognizing and sequencing significant events. This kind of opportunistic use of space, interlacing real landscapes with imaginary and symbolic ideas or orders, could be seen as a popular version of the elite arts of memory: but the essential anchoring of the blended space in a specific set of familiar local landmarks, rather than a constructed space in the scholar's imagination, perhaps suggests closer parallels with related uses of the "method of loci" in non-Western contexts, such as the Trobrianders' narrative myths structured around island geography as studied by Malinowski and then Hutchins.<sup>62</sup>

Moving through the physical environment integrates, in turn, habitual or skill memories with personal and experiential memories, again at both individual and social levels at once.

Intergenerational transmission of skills and know-how involves both specific episodes of trial and error, and repeated cumulative practice. Such meshing of more embodied and more cognitive forms of memory is a key vehicle for the maintenance of cultural knowledge and

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*Process, or Function?*, ed. Jonathan K. Foster and Marko Jelicic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 232–72.

<sup>62</sup> Frances Harwood, "Myth, Memory, and the Oral Tradition: Cicero in the Trobriands," *American Anthropologist* 78, no. 4 (1976): 783–96; and Hutchins, *Cognition in the Wild*. For different points of comparison here see also, on projection and imagination, David Kirsh, "Projection, Problem Space and Anchoring," in *Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*, ed. Neils Taatgen and Hedderik van Rijn (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2009); and, on material mnemonics in other ancient landscapes, Lynne Kelly, *Knowledge and Power in Prehistoric Societies: Orality, Memory, and the Transmission of Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

creativity.<sup>63</sup> Notably, modernist and violent schemes for cutting children off from their traditional communities—in the misguided assimilationism behind the forced removal of the “stolen generations” in Australia and Canada, for example—have targeted bodily habits as much as stories, and skills and customs as much as explicit or traditional knowledge.<sup>64</sup> Only when cultural apprenticeship can take its natural multimodal form, when younger people learn how to act and what to do in the right places and at the right times through being exposed to specific information, will embodied practice shape and fill in the gaps in explicit narratives and memories.

But mindful bodies do not operate only in the actual environment. The way that we inhabit imagined worlds is often as important and emotionally significant as our location in real geographies. Bodily movements, like memories, have many functions beyond the instrumental aims of the present: in, across, and between particular locations, they carry the past, they suggest futures, and they realize possible or sometimes impossible alternatives. As Casey puts it, “the lived body traces out the arena for the remembered scenes that inhere so steadfastly in particular places: the body’s maneuvers and movements, *imagined as well as actual*, make room for remembering placed scenes.”<sup>65</sup> So, finally, just as Rzepka showed us imagination operating in perception, projection, and fantasy alike, so we can identify a central imaginative component in place memory. Place memory is not bound by the limitations of perception or of the singular physical world: it is intrinsically also imagined and imaginative, affording “a local habitation” to many and varied forms of dream, fiction, and wish. This is apparent even in the documentary and heavily practical archives excavated by cultural

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<sup>63</sup> Kim Sterelny, *The Evolved Apprentice* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).

<sup>64</sup> Sue Campbell, *Our Faithfulness to the Past: The Ethics and Politics of Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

<sup>65</sup> Casey, *Remembering*, 189, italics added.

historians: for Wood, “custom and local memory constructed ways of seeing the landscape, *enmeshed within a complex web of imagined boundaries and spaces*, caught within a world of living tradition.”<sup>66</sup> While the historical study of such imagined boundaries and spaces, alongside other phenomena of memory and place, poses many challenges, it can potentially point the way to topics toward which psychology and cognitive theory need to reach.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Wood, *Memory of the People*, 13, italics added.

<sup>67</sup> My thanks to the editors; to Gail Kern Paster for her inspirational work and inspiring example over many years; to Lyn Tribble and my other collaborators in historical research, including Nick Keene and my colleagues on the Conversions project, especially Ben Schmidt, Mark Vessey, Bronwen Wilson, and Paul Yachnin; and to Greg Downey, Graeme Friedman, Christine Harris-Smyth, Roland Smith, and Kim Sterelny.